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I. INTRODUCTION 
Larry Laudan’s recent work, including his most recent book,1 previous 
articles,2 and now his article and presentation for this Symposium,3 give us 
cause to reflect on the fundamental goals of the criminal justice system, and 
on whether our institutions, and the research surrounding them, are raising 
the right questions and resolving them in the most  accurate and effective 
ways.4  For Professor Laudan, the primary purpose of the criminal justice 
system is to minimize harm—whether harm committed by the state against 
innocent individuals (conviction of the innocent—the problem of false 
positives), or harm caused by individuals engaging in crime (which is 
exacerbated by what he calls false acquittals, or the false negative problem).5  
For too long, he argues, commentators and the system itself have focused too 
much on the former, to the neglect of the latter. 
 
 1  See generally LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIAL AND ERRORS? 
(2016). 
 2  E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65 
(2008); Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295 (2003). 
 3  Larry Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Patterns in 
Criminal Prosecutions by “Empiricizing” the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False 
Acquittals Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018). 
 4  A theme that runs through much of Professor Laudan’s work on these issues it that the 
criminal justice system, like any form of empirical inquiry, should be concerned about 
gathering and assessing data on the system’s failure rates—the rates at which it produces both 
false positive (false convictions) and false negatives (what he calls false acquittals).  No doubt 
such data would be valuable.  But as I discuss in greater detail infra, Part III, Professor Laudan 
overlooks that assessing those rates requires access to ground truth, or a gold standard test of 
reliability or accuracy—something that simply is not available in the vast majority of criminal 
cases.  Unfortunately, in place of real data—which is realistically unattainable—Professor 
Laudan builds mathematical formulas for assessing the system and its structures upon error 
rates that are little more than guesses and assumptions—and quite debatable ones at that, as 
we shall see.   
 5  It is debatable whether the notion of a “false acquittal” even makes sense, as either an 
epistemological or a legal matter.  That is because we never can know why a jury acquits any 
individual.  Sometimes, it might be because the defendant is in some absolute sense guilty, 
but the jury cannot discern it, at least not beyond a reasonable doubt (itself a proper judgment, 
but one Professor Laudan would consider factually erroneous).  Note, however, that we have 
no way of gauging or assessing that (unlike in exonerations cases, where new evidence is used 
to establish innocence).  In other instances, however, the jury might acquit because, although 
convinced beyond any real doubt of guilt, the jury is expressing some other value or purpose—
to punish the prosecutor, to act as a check on what jurors may see as a runaway government, 
and /or to reflect a community’s sense that the law at issue is unjust.  While Professor Laudan 
might count those as false acquittals, in our constitutional system, the jury exists precisely to 
exercise that sort of community control over the government, which cannot truly be 
considered an error or a false acquittal.  As Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel observed in their 
1966 study of the American jury, “The jury, it is said, is a remarkable device for insuring that 
we are governed by the spirit of the law and not by its letter; for insuring that rigidity of any 
general rule of law can be shaped to justice in the particular case.”  HARRY KALVEN & HANS 
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8–9 (1971).  I return to this point infra, at text accompanying 
footnotes 65–67. 
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Throughout much of Professor Laudan’s work on these topics, his 
arguments follow a similar pattern and reach a similar conclusion.  That 
argument, presented here in very simplified form, is as follows.  First, to 
assess the appropriate procedural rules and burdens of proof in criminal 
cases, he contends, we need to understand empirically the costs of both false 
negatives and false positives.  He then extrapolates from admittedly meager 
data what he believes are the false positive and false negative error rates in 
the criminal justice system, and concludes that false acquittals are a much 
bigger problem than false convictions.  His prescription is a rather startling 
call to incarcerate many more people, and for much longer than we currently 
do, at least for violent crimes.6 
Professor Laudan’s method for increasing our incarceration levels is 
equally unsettling: he urges us to rejigger the system to increase convictions 
in ways that he acknowledges will also cause an increase in convictions of 
the innocent.  His most prominent call is to abandon the reasonable doubt 
standard, at least for repeat violent offenders.  To support this claim, 
Professor Laudan argues that each false acquittal for a violent crime7 causes 
1.2 harms because on average, individuals who have committed a violent 
crime will commit 1.2 more violent crimes.8  On the other side of the ledger, 
Professor Laudan argues that false convictions (false positives) cause 
approximately 2.2 harms each—1 harm to the wrongly convicted individual 
plus the 1.2 crimes that the true perpetrator who is not apprehended will 
commit.9  From this, Professor Laudan argues, the true comparative cost of 
false convictions to false acquittals is 2.2 to 1.2, or roughly 2 to 1.10  
Professor Laudan then contends that the rules of evidence and criminal 
procedure overwhelmingly and inappropriately favor defendants and, in 
particular, that the proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (which he 
refers to by the acronym “BARD”)11 is out of alignment with these 
comparative costs.  He contends that we currently acquit far more guilty 
people than we convict innocents, so that we need to recalibrate the equation 
in ways that make the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions closer to 




 6  See infra text accompanying notes 207–08. 
 7  Professor Laudan generally limits his argument to violent crimes.  LAUDAN, supra note 
1, at 1245.   
 8  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1253. 
 9  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1253. 
 10  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1253. 
 11  I do not find the BARD acronym helpful, so I generally refer to the standard as the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” or simply the “reasonable doubt” standard, except when quoting 
for Professor Laudan, where I quote the acronym “BARD” as he uses it. 
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Professor Laudan’s primary complaint is with the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard.  He argues that, given the true value of comparative harms, 
the burden should be a much lower one, more consistent with the “clear and 
convincing” standard.  In his current article, he refines this claim a bit, 
arguing for a sliding scale burden of proof that is dependent on the accused’s 
prior record.  He contends that, because individuals with prior records are 
much more likely to recidivate than are first-time offenders, the clear-and-
convincing standard should be applicable to repeat offenders, while first-
timers can still be tried under the reasonable doubt standard.12 
In this response, I address some of Professor Laudan’s claims, and the 
assumptions and data underlying them.  In Part II, I take on some of Professor 
Laudan’s claims about the nature, purpose, and effects of the reasonable 
doubt standard.  I contend that neither is the standard the culprit he thinks it 
is in creating injustice, nor does it create the type of formal mathematical, 
probabilistic assessment of evidence that he assumes it does.  In Part III, I 
point out the difficulty—indeed the impossibility—of accurately assessing 
the real rate of either false negatives or false positives in the criminal justice 
system, and hence the futility of Professor Laudan’s enterprise.  In Part IV, 
I add to that conclusion by challenging his attempts to meaningfully quantify 
the harms from both false convictions and false acquittals, and his 
conclusions about the comparative harms from each.  Part V then examines 
Professor Laudan’s claims about the various ways that the system currently 
is skewed to (overly) protect criminal defendants, including guilty ones.  I 
show that, in many respects, Professor Laudan has the analysis exactly 
backwards—and in the ways that count most for determining the disputed 
facts.  I also challenge his prescription for reforms that would ratchet up mass 
incarceration rates, disproportionately harm low-income and minority 
people, and sweep even more innocent people into prison, all in his quest to 
convict and imprison more of the guilty.  Finally, in Part VI, I contend that 
because the mathematized weighing and apportioning of harms that 
Professor Laudan undertakes is a doomed enterprise with enormous 
unacceptable costs, the reform agenda—whether one cares more about crime 
prevention or innocence protection—ought to be to look first for ways to 
reform the system to improve its overall diagnosticity, and to simultaneously 
reduce both false negatives and false positives, without the flawed 
assumption that the two are always and inevitably in tension.  I show how 
this, indeed, is the primary thrust of the Innocence Movement. 
 
 
 12  Laudan, supra note 3, at 1251. 
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II. PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Professor Laudan’s work, at its core, repeatedly challenges our 
adherence to the reasonable doubt standard.  He argues that we should 
seriously doubt “[t]he belief that the two-century old standard of proof 
(‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’) must not be changed because it is 
required by the Constitution and because it alone protects the innocent.  Both 
claims are patently false.”13  I have neither the space nor the inclination to 
debate here the constitutional roots of the reasonable doubt standard, 
especially because it is so thoroughly entrenched in constitutional doctrine 
that it is inconceivable the courts will abandon it any time soon.14  But I will 
briefly address some of Professor Laudan’s related contentions. 
A. Definitional Challenges 
Professor Laudan’s first attack on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard is that it defies definition.15  It is not quite accurate, however, to say 
that “beyond a reasonable doubt” lacks definition.  As Jules Epstein points 
out, courts routinely define “beyond a reasonable doubt” through standard 
jury instructions.16  To be sure, various courts have used different wording 
to define the standard, and courts and critics alike have bemoaned the 
difficulty in providing a clear definition.  But these indictments provide a 
weak basis for abandoning the standard—which in its essence expresses the 
fundamental value that we need to be very sure about guilt before we permit 
the state to impose draconian sanctions depriving individuals of life, liberty, 
or property as punishment for perceived misdeeds. 
On its merits, Professor Laudan’s ambiguity argument tells us little 
about how to apportion error in criminal cases, in part because it says little 
about how any other standard would work better.  With the reasonable doubt 
standard there should be little confusion about what is meant by “doubt,” so 
Professor Laudan’s (and other critics’) concern must be with the modifier 
“reasonable.”  But “reasonable” or “reasonableness” is a term that is 
ubiquitous in the law; from the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures to the standard of care that defines 
negligence in tort law, to all of the various tests that rely upon some form of 
 
 13  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix. 
 14  In this regard, I am in complete agreement with Paul Cassell’s analysis of the 
unconstitutionality of Professor Laudan’s proposal.  Paul G. Cassell, Risking Wrongful 
Convictions: Quantifying the Risk, Addressing the Risk, and Escaping the Risk, 48 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1435 (2018).  
 15  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix, 4. 
 16  See Jules Epstein, The National Commission on Forensic Science: Impactful or 
Ineffectual?, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 743, 770 (2018) (quoting U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3.06 (2011), http://www.ca3.usco
urts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Chapter%203%20Rev%20April%202015.pdf). 
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the “reasonable person” test.  If the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is 
unsustainable because it depends on the inherently intuitive notion of 
“reasonableness,” then the law as a whole is in serious trouble.  In the end, 
Professor Laudan’s own solution exposes the emptiness of this criticism of 
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  Professor Laudan ultimately 
advocates for a “clear and convincing” standard in some criminal cases, but 
never explains how that solves his clarity problem.  There is indeed nothing 
intrinsically clearer about “clear and convincing” than there is about 
“reasonable doubt,” and Professor Laudan points to nothing providing the 
clarity he asserts we need. 
B. Overclaiming About Reasonable Doubt 
To his credit, Professor Laudan does not really hang his argument on 
concerns about the difficulty in defining “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Rather, he argues that what is more important is that “we should . . . look at 
[BARD’s] results; that is, how often do erroneous verdicts occur at trial and 
in pleas and how often can those errors be attributed to BARD?  And, we 
need to ask, what is the optimal error ratio—that ratio that will produce the 
fewest harms to innocent victims.”17 
But even with that focus on producing the least harm to innocent 
victims, Professor Laudan’s near single-minded focus on the reasonable 
doubt standard is puzzling.  He alleges that supporters of the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard claim that “it alone protects the innocent”18 and 
that it is “the most important rule governing the conduct of criminal trials.”19  
Certainly the standard is important—even fundamental—but to single it out 
as the key or sole feature of the system for determining the prevalence and 
distribution of errors reveals an odd, unjustified fixation.  The system is far 
more complex than that and, in the end, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard, as important as it is, is implemented through a jury instruction, 
which jurors may or may not follow with fidelity.  It does nothing to affect 
the production, access to, and presentation of evidence, which likely 
represent much more significant variables in determining both the 
prevalence and distribution of error. 
Professor Laudan nonetheless asserts that “the overwhelming reason 
for most false negatives is not a flawed case made by the prosecutor nor a 
lack of strong inculpatory evidence but the fact that, to convict someone of 
a crime, our system generally requires that the jury must be unanimously 
persuaded of his guilt to a degree of near certainty (proof beyond a 
 
 17  Laudan, supra note 3 (emphasis in original). 
 18  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix. 
 19  LAUDAN, supra note 1. 
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reasonable doubt).”20  Yet, despite his plea for empirical evidence and data 
to assess the workings of the criminal justice system, Professor Laudan 
provides no data or evidence to support this claim—he just asserts it as true. 
C. Mathematizing Proof or Expressing Values? 
Much of Professor Laudan’s claim about the power of the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard appears to rest on his penchant for treating fact-
finding as a mathematical process of apportioning discernible probabilities.  
He assumes, for example, that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
translates in jurors’ minds as something akin to 90% certainty or more.  From 
this, Professor Laudan makes the remarkable assertion that “all arrestees 
with a likelihood of guilt of 80% or 70% are almost certain to win an 
acquittal, even though the numbers tell us that it quite likely that they 
committed the crime.”21  While that might be true if adjudication were a 
mathematical proposition working with known likelihoods, that it is of 
course not at all how it actually works.22  Nor should it be.23  The process is 
far too nuanced, value-laden, and emotion-driven to be reduced to such neat 
formulaic expressions.  Professor Laudan tells us nothing about how jurors 
in the real world come up with, as Michael Risinger puts it, “credible 
numbers to mathematize what is meant by standards of proof.”24 
 
 20  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 13. 
 21  Laudan, supra note 3, at 1245.  
 22  Susan Haack, for example, has explained that “probabilistic conceptions of degrees of 
proof . . . are fatally flawed,” because “degrees of epistemic warrant simply don’t conform to 
the axioms of standard mathematical calculus of probabilities; from which it follows that 
degrees of proof cannot plausibly be constructed probabilistically.”  SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE 
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW xvii–xviii (2014).  See also id. at 18–19, 
61–62.  She elaborates: “[W]e can’t look to probability theory for an understanding of degrees 
and standards of proof in the law, but must look, instead, to an older and less formal branch 
of inquiry: epistemology.”  Id. at 47.  Lawrence Tribe has likewise observed that “the lay trier 
will surely find it difficult at best, and sometimes impossible, to attach to P(X) a number that 
correctly represents his real prior assessment.  Few laymen have had experience with the 
assignment of probabilities, and it might end up being a matter of pure chance whether a 
particular juror converts his mental state of partial certainty to a figure like .33, .43, or 
somewhere in between.”  Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in 
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1358 (1971). 
 23  Tribe, for example, has pointed out that, if we were to mathematize evidential 
probabilities at trials, one effect would be “the dwarfing of soft variables”—facts that are 
easily quantifiable will be counted, and those that cannot will be disregarded or minimized, 
leading to outcomes in which, “despite what turns out to be a spurious appearance of accuracy 
and completeness, is likely to be significantly warped and hence highly suspect.”  Tribe, supra 
note 22, at 1361–62.  Accordingly, as Haack concludes, “it isn’t feasible to put precise 
numbers on degrees of proof; nor would it necessarily be desirable to do so even if we could.”  
HAACK, supra note 22, at 59. 
 24  D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 
(2018) [hereinafter Risinger, Leveraging Surprise]. 
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Professor Risinger and others have, on several occasions, offered more 
compelling accounts of how the reasonable doubt standard works—not as a 
mathematical or formal probabilistic assessment,25 but more as a value 
statement about the importance of the decision the jurors are being called 
upon to make. 
 
The term “beyond a reasonable doubt” . . . forces the individual 
juror to ponder the question of how the law wants him to decide, 
and to examine his own soul, so to speak, to answer the question 
of whether or not he is as sure as the law requires him to be.  It is 
intended to make even the juror who thinks that the defendant “did 
it,” in everyday terms, think twice.26 
 
In this Symposium, Professor Risinger develops this thought further in a far-
more sophisticated argument than I can approximate here.  He argues that 
standards of proof “are not properly seen as statements entailing or implying 
any formal version of modern mathematized probability theory or statistical 
theory,” but rather as “degrees of belief” measured by “the intensity of the 
surprise that would be experienced if it were established that the proposition 
believed to be true is in fact false.  Professor Risinger’s “central claim is that 
people believe something to be true to the extent that they would be surprised 
to find out it was false.”27 
Indeed, prominent schools of thought about the trial process today, such 
as the narrative theory of the trial, the story model, or the relative plausibility 
theory, all posit that the side that wins—even in a criminal case—is the side 
that tells the story that best fits with the evidence presented.  It is a process 
driven not so much by mathematical likelihoods of guilt as it is by 
comparative strength of competing narratives.28  Contrary to Professor 
 
 25  Id. at 973 (“I am of the school that thinks that attempts at formalizing the meaning of 
burdens through the use of numerical expressions of probability is probably a bad idea in 
theory and definitely a bad idea in practice.  Formal mathematization can have all sorts of 
unintended consequences.”).   
 26  Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due 
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 199 (1969). 
 27  Risinger, Leveraging Surprise, supra note 24, at 973.  Risinger elaborates: “But how 
do we measure these levels of surprise, or at any rate induce jurors to measure them in 
themselves?  Not by artificially generated cardinal numbers to put into a full probability 
calculus, but by a well-ordered system of categories designated by words like what are now 
called (rather unfortunately, I now believe) “words of estimative probability.”  In fact, the 
traditional three standards of proof of our litigation system are a rank-ordered, three-category 
system defined by various formulas, which can be thought of as words (or word formulas) of 
estimative probability.  But what I propose is a system which uses what I would prefer to call 
“words of estimative surprise,” such as mildly surprised, surprised, quite surprised, greatly 
surprised, astonished, shocked, etc.  Id. at 981 (footnotes omitted). 
 28  See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in 
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Laudan’s artificially mathematized world, under the narrative theory of the 
trial, the defendant whom Professor Laudan somehow assesses to be 70%-
80% likely to be guilty might indeed be convicted, under the narrative theory 
of the trial because the guilt narrative is the one that might appear far more 
compelling.  Or in Professor Risinger’s terms, the jury that considers the 
competing evidence in such a case might be quite surprised, even shocked, 
to learn that the accused was in fact innocent.29 
In the end, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is based 
on something more fundamental, but less quantifiable, than Professor 
Laudan’s algorithm assumes.  Even if we could somehow assign a 
mathematical weight to the harms that individuals suffer from the effects of 
wrongful conviction and the effects of being victimized by a recidivist who 
was mistakenly acquitted of a prior offense, that still would not justify 
modeling a burden of proof based on those weights.  That is because the 
burden of proof—the requirement that the state prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt—and indeed, Blackstone’s ratio (the well-known maxim 
that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
suffer”30)—are not premised not on some illusion of mathematical precision, 
or on some notion that the harms caused to victims of all sorts can be 
meaningfully assessed and weighed.31  They are instead based, at least in 
significant part, on the notion that, whatever suffering the victimization may 
cause, it is far worse as a structural matter in a free society for the government 
to actively and deliberately deprive its citizens of life, liberty, or the ability 
to lead the life they choose, than it is for a private individual, through 
criminal misdeeds, to harm another and to escape punishment.  Several years 
ago, Professor Risinger also made this point, in response to a similar proposal 
made by Professors Laudan and Ronald Allen: 
 
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 
1993); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013); Nancy 
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the 
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 189 (1992).. 
 28  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (1765). 
 29  Risinger, Leveraging Surprise, supra note 24, at 973.   
 30  Id. 
 31  Relatedly, Professor Laudan has a curious penchant for treating the Blackstone ratio 
as if it were meant to express a precise mathematical weighing of the costs of false convictions 
and false acquittals.  Others have persuasively explained that the Blackstone ratio was never 
meant to express a precise mathematical formula, but rather a more general sense of values, 
so I will not repeat those arguments here.  See, e.g., Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error 
in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2015); D. Michael Risinger, Tragic 
Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 991, 1002 (2010) [hereinafter Risinger, Tragic Consequences]; Marvin Zalman, The 
Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319 (2018).  
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Viewing the state as having more responsibility for harm done 
directly to the immediate subjects of its acts than for the harm 
done indirectly by its failures to act, or by its choices to act one 
way rather than another, has a long tradition, especially in 
situations where the latter harm is done by the subsequent choice 
of an independent human agent.32 
 
The reasonable doubt standard, therefore, reflects the notion that, when 
the state acts directly to inflict massive punitive harm on an individual, it 
must be constrained to act in only the clearest and most compelling of 
cases.33  As Michael Corrado has written recently in comparing the civil 
burden of a preponderance of the evidence to the criminal burden of beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
 
When all that is at issue is the allocation of a loss that can be 
measured in financial terms, the accuser needs only to prove the 
defendant’s fault by a preponderance of the evidence, but where 
the defendant’s very life or freedom is at stake the burden is 
considerably higher: the prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In the criminal case the community has placed 
the high burden upon the state because the imposition of 
punishment by the state is such a terrifying act.34 
 
 
 32  Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 31, at 1020 (footnote omitted).  For this 
point, Professor Risinger draws, in part, on writings of the nineteenth-century reformist Sir 
Samuel Romilly, who famously observed, “When, therefore, the guilty escape, the Law has 
merely failed. . . .  But when the innocent become the victims of the Law . . . it creates the 
very evil it was to cure, and destroys the security it was made to preserve.” Id. at 998 n.24 
(quoting SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY, Observations on the Criminal Law as It Relates to Capital 
Punishments, and on the Mode in Which It Is Administered, in 1 THE SPEECHES OF SIR SAMUEL 
ROMILLY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 106, 165–66 (1820)).  Professor Risinger wrote in 
response to arguments propounded in Allen & Laudan’s article, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 
2. 
 33  Professor Cassell, in his contribution to this Symposium, acknowledges this argument 
but ultimately rejects it as unpersuasive because, he contends, in modern society providing 
security against crime has become a “special responsibility” of the government, just as is its 
obligation to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.  See Cassell, supra note 14, at 
1444.  It is no doubt true that the government has responsibility for providing security against 
crime and also restraining itself to avoid directly inflicting criminal punishments on the 
innocent.  Professor Cassell’s argument, however, tells us nothing about how to weigh failure 
to meet either of those responsibilities.  Cassell, supra note 14, at 1444.  I suggest that, even 
acknowledging Professor Casssell’s point, the government’s first obligation is to avoid 
directly inflicting harm on its people, just like a physician, who has a special responsibility 
for providing care to her patients, bears a primary and overriding obligation to “do no harm.”  
 34  Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Burden of Proof 1 (U.N.C. Legal Studies 
Research Paper 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2997654. 
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Professor Laudan’s quantification simply fails to capture the real essence of 
the reasonable doubt standard. 
III. MAKING ERRORS COUNTING ERRORS 
A. Verdict Errors 
To justify his assault on the reasonable doubt standard, Professor 
Laudan attempts to measure what he believes are the harms produced by that 
standard.  To start, Professor Laudan takes legal actors and scholars to task 
for failing to figure out how often criminal justice processes produce 
inaccurate results—both false positives and false negatives.  “Such 
ignorance,” he says, “speaks not only to an intellectual and moral laxness but 
also to the abandonment of the cardinal rule of any self-respecting system of 
empirical inquiry, to wit, devising and then utilizing methods to figure out 
how often its results are reliable.”35  But it is not quite that simple because 
the reality is that there is no good method for counting criminal justice 
system errors.  After all, the processes are themselves the best we have been 
able to come up with for figuring out what happened in a contested historical 
event. The trial (or short of that, the plea) is itself the closest we have to a 
gold standard for determining truth.  Unlike most scientific methods of 
empirical inquiry, which have true gold standard diagnostic tools (e.g., blood 
tests as a check on the reliability of clinical judgment for many illnesses) or 
the ability to set up randomized controlled studies, the law usually has 
nothing more than the outcomes of the individual cases themselves.36  Only 
in the exoneration context do we sometimes have the ability to discover error, 
through the production of new evidence of innocence (especially DNA 
evidence).  This tells us that error does occur, and does so at above a trivial 
level, which can help us understand the conditions and contributing factors 
that can lead to false positives.  It cannot, however, tell us a rate.  For false 
negatives (false acquittals), as discussed below, we do not even have that. 
1. Problems with Counting False Positives 
Despite Professor Laudan’s criticism, scholars have attempted to 
estimate wrongful conviction rates, relying primarily on examining discrete 
cohorts of wrongful convictions.  But even those scholars have noted that 
their estimates are rough, or reflective of only discrete subcategories of 
convictions, which cannot easily be extrapolated across the criminal justice 
system more broadly.  Professor Laudan himself relies upon—and accepts 
 
 35  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 36  Indeed, examples that Professor Laudan explicitly relies upon include error rates for 
medical tests and public opinion polls, both of which usually can be measured ultimately 
against ground truth. LAUDAN, supra note 1, at xiv. 
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as a true value—an average of several of those estimates (although he rounds 
the estimated error rate downward to 3%),37 including one based upon an 
analysis of wrongful convictions in capital rape murder cases by Michael 
Risinger, which estimated an error rate of 3.3%-5%.38  But Professor Laudan 
ignores Professor Risinger’s own caution against attempting to generalize 
from the rate of wrongful convictions applicable to all crimes and all 
jurisdictions.  Professor Risinger cautions that such extrapolation cannot be 
done because “the universe of criminal convictions is almost certainly 
heavily substructured in regard to factual innocence rates.”39  This 
substructuring, Professor Risinger notes, combined with limited access to 
reliable information about wrongful conviction rates for most types of cases, 
“renders virtually useless any notion of a system-wide ‘wrongful conviction 
rate.’”40  Professor Risinger adds, “[t]here are two reasons why we should 
resist the temptation to expend much effort in pondering such a general 
average factual wrongful conviction rate: first, we are unlikely to ever be 
able to derive it very specifically, and, second, it would not tell us anything 
very important if we knew it.”41 
2. Problems with Counting False Negatives 
The foundation for Professor Laudan’s mathematized analysis is further 
undermined because, as Professor Laudan’s indictment of the scholarship 
notes, far less is known about false acquittals, or more broadly, false 
negatives.  Given constitutional constraints, there are virtually no cases in 
which an acquitted individual has been later proven guilty based on new and 
better evidence, so there is almost no data.  Professor Laudan laments this as 
a moral failing of criminal justice actors and observers, rather than as a 
reality of the inaccessibility of ground truth: “An erroneous acquittal will 
almost always escape detection, not because it would be especially difficult 
to identify false acquittals if we earnestly looked for them but because almost 
no one gives a damn about their occurrence.”42 
 
 
 37  See LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 54 (citing Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the 
United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 n.21 (2005); KALVEN 
& ZEISEL, supra note 5; Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal 
Defendants Who are Sentenced to Death, 111 PNAS 7230 (2014), http://www.pnas.org/conte
nt/111/20/7230.full.pdf; D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified 
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) [hereinafter 
Risinger, Innocents Convicted]. 
 38  Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 37, at 761. 
 39  Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 37, at 783. 
 40  Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 31, at 991, 993–97. 
 41  Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 37, at 782. 
 42  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
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Professor Laudan is correct that the data are not there, but it is not 
because of disinterest. Rather, data about false negatives that is reliable and 
meaningful is nearly impossible to obtain—a reality that Professor Laudan 
cannot accept because it dooms his enterprise.  On the other side of the 
equation, discovering a single false conviction case requires enormous 
resources, access to evidence, dogged resolve, skilled lawyers, enormous 
luck, and a long time (an average of nine to fourteen years).43  Professor 
Laudan never tells us how anything approximating that could be undertaken 
in acquittal cases, especially given that the double jeopardy clause bars 
retrials based on new evidence.44  While scholars could theoretically examine 
acquittals and render opinions—based on little more (and often less) than the 
information already available to the legal system—the undertaking would be 
enormous and those opinions would not be worth much and would prove 
little.  Thus, even the very limited tools that exist for trying to estimate a 
false conviction rate simply do not exist for trying to estimate a false 
acquittal rate.  Hence, Sam Gross and Barbara O’Brien’s observation about 
the challenges in assessing a false conviction rate applies with even more 
force to false negatives: “The fundamental problem with false convictions is 
also one of their defining features: they are hidden from view.  In most cases 
false convictions are not merely invisible but hard if not impossible to 
identify when we try.”45  While Professor Laudan recognizes this dearth of 
data, and laments it, he does not let that stop him, he simply makes a guess 
(a quite debatable guess), and advocates wholesale constitutional revision on 
the basis of the assumptions underlying that guess. 
At the outset, one has to wonder why Professor Laudan focuses so much 
effort on claiming that false acquittals are the central problem facing our 
criminal justice system today.  Professor Laudan begins his piece with an 
 
 43  The average time from conviction to exoneration among the DNA cases is 14 years.  
2017 Innocence Project, DNA Exonerations in the United States, https://www.innocencepr
oject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).  For the 
exonerations listed in the broader National Registry of Exonerations, the average time spent 
in prison before exoneration is 8.7.  The National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations by 
State, (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-
in-the-United-States-Map.aspx.  
 44  Professor Laudan instead objects that we cling to the double jeopardy bar that prevents 
the state from appealing not guilty verdicts or ever retrying an acquitted individual.  See, e.g., 
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 10–11.  But this robust version of the Constitution’s double jeopardy 
clause is long-settled in this country.  Debating the wisdom of that constitutional provision or 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it is more than I can take on in this relatively short 
response to Professor Laudan.  For my purposes here, it is enough to note that the double 
jeopardy clause poses a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the type of assessment of 
mistaken acquittals upon which Professor Laudan’s argument depends.   
 45  Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: 
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL STUD. 927, 
928 (2008). 
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epigrammatic quote from Daniel Givelber to the effect that “[a]cquittals are 
the mystery disposition of the criminal justice system.”46  But, building off 
of that to argue that the system acquits too many guilty people, Professor 
Laudan overlooks that one significant reason Professor Givelber says that 
acquittals are such a mystery is because they are so rare.47  Indeed, as 
Professor Givelber notes, the data show that the ratio of convictions to 
acquittals in federal court is somewhere between fifty to seventy convictions 
for every acquittal.48  Given the rarity of acquittals (and the necessarily much 
smaller category of “false” acquittals), it is difficult to discern why one 
would focus on false acquittals as a significant criminal justice problem.  
That is especially so given that a certain minimal level of acquittals is 
essential to any legitimate system of criminal justice.  Without some small 
yet significant rate of acquittals—which appears to be right where we are—
the system would appear (and likely would be) rigged, and would lose its 
integrity as a check on governmental power.  Moving the acquittal rate much, 
if any, below what we already have, therefore runs a significant risk of that 
delegitimizing effect. 
Undaunted, Professor Laudan builds his argument for fundamental 
realignment of the criminal justice system on extrapolation and assumptions 
from thin reeds of evidence about false acquittals.  For his estimates, he relies 
primarily on Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel’s classic study of judge and 
jury agreement and disagreement,49 and data on jury verdicts in Scotland, 
where juries have the option of rendering two types of acquittal verdicts: 
“guilt not proven” and “not guilty.”50  For example, turning to Kalven and 
Zeisel’s study, Professor Laudan notes the rate at which judges would have 
convicted when juries acquitted, which Kalven & Zeisel found to be about 
17% of the cases.51  Professor Laudan further notes that, among the cases 
included in Kalven & Zeisel’s study, the judges reported that they believed 
that only about 15% of the acquittals were clear acquittals, and 85% were 
close cases.52  Professor Laudan then takes at face value that this means that 
the close cases—85% of the acquittals—”are close enough to warrant an 
assumption that these are probably factually guilty defendants.”53  From data 
 
 46  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation 
and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2005)). 
 47  Givelber, supra note 46, at 1167. 
 48  Givelber, supra note 46, at 1167, n.3 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, 419, 460 (Ann L. Pastore & 
Kathleen Maguire eds., 2000)). 
 49  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5. 
 50  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 58. 
 51  KALVEN & ZEISEL supra note 5, at 56. 
 52  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 59. 
 53  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 59. 
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and reasoning of this type, Professor Laudan ultimately concludes that he 
can make a good guess at a rate of false acquittals, while in the process 
ignoring Kalven & Zeisel’s own caution that “[i]t is not easy to know what 
to make of these figures.”54 
Professor Laudan’s willingness to accept the judges’ perceptions of the 
closeness of the evidence as proof of guilt also ignores the lessons from the 
wrongful conviction cases: that virtually every one of the exoneration cases 
involved evidence that convinced prosecutor, judge, jury, and often even 
defense counsel, that the defendant was clearly guilty.55  The exoneration 
cases tell us we cannot just assume that even judges’ assessments of the 
evidence can reliably tell us what portion of jury verdicts are factually 
erroneous. 
Kalven & Zeisel’s study is widely acknowledged as path breaking 
largely because of its data identifying a cluster of cases in which the judge 
and jury disagreed about the outcome of the case—most often cases in which 
the judge would have convicted but the jury acquitted (a total of about 17% 
of all cases).  Any assumption that those disagreements provide further 
support for a claim of widespread false negatives in jury verdicts, however, 
must be reconciled with the reasons Kalven & Zeisel identified as factors 
that they thought accounted for the disagreements between judge and jury: 
evidence factors (i.e., differential weighting of the evidence); facts only the 
judge knew; disparity of counsel; jury sentiments about the individual 
defendant; and jury sentiments about the law.56 
The claim that the cases in Kalven & Zeisel’s study in which the jury 
acquitted but the judge would have convicted represent factually erroneous 
verdicts would have the strongest claim in those cases in which the judge 
had access to inculpatory evidence that the jury did not.  But that accounts 
for only 2% of the cases in which the judges would have convicted but the 
jury acquitted; excluded evidence is virtually inconsequential as an 
explanation for acquittals in Kalven & Zeisel’s study.57  Moreover, even in 
that category of cases, we cannot be confident that the judge was right and 
the jury was wrong—that is, that the jury’s verdict was a “false acquittal” as 
a factual matter—because in some of those cases the additional evidence that 
the judge would have considered would have included evidence that the 
 
 54  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 58; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 49, at 57. 
 55  Brandon Garrett’s analysis of the first 200 DNA exonerations, for example, revealed 
that courts denied relief to almost all of these actually innocent people, granted innocence-
based relief to none, found most errors to be harmless because of their assessment that the 
evidence was strong, and even opined in many cases that the evidence against these innocent 
people was “overwhelming.”  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
55, 61 (2008). 
 56  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 106–07. 
 57  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 121 n.1. 
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Rules of Evidence exclude because the evidence has a tendency to impede 
rational fact-finding.58  This includes evidence like character and propensity 
evidence,59 unreliable forensic evidence or expert opinions,60 coerced 
confessions,61 the judge’s personal knowledge of the parties or other extra-
judicial facts62 (which can be unreliable, and hence, legally cannot be 
considered because they are either highly prejudicial, or not subject to 
adversarial testing for veracity and accuracy), or a wide range of evidence 
the judge herself deemed to be far more prejudicial than probative.63 
Moreover, it is not safe to assume that every acquittal of even an 
arguably guilty individual is truly a “false acquittal.”  Juries acquit for a wide 
variety of reasons, some based on conclusions about guilt, and others, 
equally legitimate in our constitutional system, on conclusions about mercy 
or constraint of government overreaching.  Indeed, Kalven & Zeisel 
hypothesized that jury acquittals in cases where judges would convict might 
reflect precisely that type of communitarian expression of restraint.  From 
their analysis of the judge-jury disagreement cases, Kalven & Zeisel 
developed a “liberation hypothesis”—the theory that, when the evidence was 
close, the jury felt “liberated” to acquit for non-fact reasons, such as 
sympathy for the accused or sentiment about the law.64  Daniel Givelber 
explains it this way: 
 
[Kalven & Zeisel] identified juries as more likely to acquit than 
judges, and developed a liberation hypothesis to explain the 
disparity.  If the case is close on the evidence, the jury is liberated 
to permit sentiment to guide its decision.  In their words, the jury 
“yields to sentiment in the apparent process of resolving doubts as 
 
 58  Of course, some excluded evidence is highly probative and excluding it serves other 
criminal justice system values, while impeding the search for the truth.  That is especially true 
of exclusion of evidence for violation of the Fourth Amendment, for example.  But that is not 
true of all excluded evidence. See text accompanying notes 58-64. 
 59  See FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 60  See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 61  Historically it was recognized, and empirically it is now being confirmed, that one risk 
of coerced confessions is that they can often be actually false—yet still very persuasive to 
factfinders.  See e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions 
in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004). 
 62  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 123. 
 63  See FED. R. EVID. 403.  Lest one think that judges, unlike juries, are not likely to be 
influenced by evidence that they themselves recognize to be inadmissible, the empirical 
evidence shows the contrary.  See, e.g., D. Brian Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error 
Analysis: How Do Judges Respond to Confession Errors?, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 154 
(2012) (finding that experienced judges who recognized that a confession was coerced and 
hence inadmissible were nonetheless significantly influenced by the confession when 
assessing the defendant’s guilt or innocence). 
 64  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 106, 165–66. 
FINDLEY_FORMATTED.DOCXFINDLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  9:44 AM 
2018] REDUCING ERROR  1281 
to evidence.  The jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from 
the law within the etiquette of resolving issues of fact.”  
Apparently unlike judges, juries permitted extra-legal concerns to 
temper strict justice when they acquitted the guilty.65 
 
Professor Givelber, however, questions this hypothesis, arguing that the 
empirical evidence supports the conclusion that juries usually acquit 
because, based on the evidence, the defendant is probably innocent.  
Contrary to the lesson that Professor Laudan draws from Kalven & Zeisel’s 
work, the evidence suggests that juries do not regularly acquit irrationally, 
or based on too-much fidelity to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
(if that is not an oxymoron).  Although Professor Laudan begins his piece 
with a quote from Professor Givelber about the mystery of acquittals, 
Professor Givelber has repeatedly written about the rationality, and indeed 
reliability, of jury acquittals.  Professor Givelber asserts, indeed, that 
“[d]espite the enormous publicity generated by apparently irrational 
acquittals, there appears to be no basis for believing that these are anything 
but aberrational events.”66  And his book, Not Guilty: Are the Acquitted 
Innocent?, persuasively and extensively makes the case, based on analysis 
of the empirical evidence, that acquittals are best read as factually 
supportable conclusions of actual innocence.67 
B. Charging and Dismissal Errors 
Professor Laudan makes clear, it should be noted, that when he 
discusses “false acquittals” he means “false negatives” more broadly, 
including not just erroneous jury verdicts, but also dismissals by prosecutors 
in cases where the accused was actually guilty.68  Combining his assessment 
of erroneous jury verdicts and prosecutor dismissals of charges against guilty 
suspects, he settles on a false negative rate of about 38%–40%.69 
With regard to dismissals, Professor Laudan’s claim is that the 
reasonable doubt standard is producing false negatives by imposing such a 
high burden on prosecutors that they are likely to dismiss cases, even when 
convinced of guilt, because they fear they will be unable to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  To support this conclusion, Professor Laudan 
relies primarily on survey data of prosecutors.  He notes that in several 
 
 65  Givelber, supra note 47, at 1168 (footnotes omitted) (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 
note 5, at 165). 
 66  Givelber, supra note 47, at 1169. 
 67  DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED INNOCENT? 
(2012). 
 68  Laudan, supra note 3, at 1244. 
 69  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 64–65. 
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surveys, prosecutors have identified a range of reasons for dismissing cases, 
many of which have nothing to do with doubts about guilt.70  But that too is 
a very shaky foundation upon which to determine a factual rate of false 
negatives, both because survey data is among the least reliable for assessing 
what people actually do and why they do it, and because prosecutors’ 
judgments about guilt or innocence are far from a gold standard for assessing 
factual truth, even if they are accurately reporting their motivations for 
dismissing cases.  As has been reported elsewhere, a host of cognitive biases 
and institutional pressures makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
prosecutors (like everyone else) to assess evidence objectively and reliably.71  
And the record of prosecutorial resistance to claims of innocence, even in 
the face of overwhelming evidence of innocence (including DNA) in 
exoneration cases, undermines any suggestion that prosecutorial judgments 
can be relied upon as any sort of litmus test of actual innocence.72 
While it surely is true that prosecutors in some cases dismiss charges 
despite a firm belief in guilt, it is difficult to know how much that explains, 
because the reality is there is little empirical evidence on the matter.73  One 
certainly cannot conclude, as does Professor Laudan, that it must mean the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, virtually alone, is forcing prosecutors 
to dismiss cases against a large number of actually guilty people.  
Experience, legal standards, and empirical evidence suggest that the “beyond 
a reasonable doubt” standard might not be the culprit in this process that 
Professor Laudan thinks it is, or that the dismissals are therefore factually 
wrong.  Professor Laudan largely dismisses the significance of all of the 
many reasons that prosecutors dismiss cases that have little or nothing to do 
with proof beyond a reasonable doubt—political judgments and office 
policies (for example, policies not to prosecute certain types of crimes); 
 
 70  Id. at 60–62. 
 71  See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. 
Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 
(2006). 
 72  See Amy Bach, Extraordinary Wrongful Convictions, Ordinary Measures—Why 
Measurement Matters, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2010); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s 
Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 (2006); Alafair Burke, 
Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512 
(2007); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1179–84 (2010); Daniel 
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of 
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 140–44 (2004); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: 
An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
761, 765 (2007). 
 73  According to John Pfaff, who studied justice system data for fifteen years, “Perhaps 
most problematically, we have almost no information whatsoever on what prosecutors do or 
how (or why) they do it.”  JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 17 (2017). 
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caseload pressures; and simple lack of evidence (regardless of the standard 
of proof).  Professor Laudan ignores that, in our system, prosecutors have 
virtually unfettered and unreviewable discretion in charging,74 and that 
concomitant with that authority comes the responsibility to screen cases that 
are brought to them by police.  In the caselaw and literature on prosecutors, 
effective screening—dismissal of cases—by prosecutors is seen as a strength 
of the system, not a flaw.75 
Ethics rules and legal standards further make clear that prosecutorial 
decisions are not necessarily driven exclusively or perhaps even 
predominantly by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  ABA standards 
on the prosecution function require only probable cause to initiate and pursue 
a prosecution.76  Likewise, under the Fourth Amendment, police need only 
probable cause to make an arrest, and prosecutors need only probable cause 
to indict or obtain a bindover at a preliminary hearing to permit the case to 
proceed to trial.  Professor Laudan misunderstands this to mean that, “[t]o 
make an arrest official, the police must persuade either a judge or a grand 
jury (or both) that a rational person, confronted with the available evidence, 
would conclude that the defendant probably committed the crime.”77  
Professor Laudan elaborates, still incorrectly, that by the time a case enters 
the prosecution process the accused “is considered by the police, a grand jury 
and/or the arraigning judge to be more likely than not to be guilty on the 
available evidence.”78  But probable cause does not require any showing that 
the accused “probably” or “more-likely-than-not” committed the crime.  The 
probable cause standard—whether for arrest, indictment, or other 
charging—is explicitly a lower standard than that.  Probable cause means 
nothing more than that there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime 
may have been committed, and that the accused may have committed it; that 
basis may be well below 50-50.79  Professor Laudan’s misunderstanding of 
 
 74  E.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978). 
 75  See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Dismissals as Teachable Moments (and 
Databases) for the Police, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); State v. Farrell, 293 
A.2d 176, 179 (N.J. 1972) (“The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is 
not to convict, but to see that justice is done.”). 
 76  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
Standard 3-3.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be 
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows 
that the charges are not supported by probable cause.”).   
 77  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 62. 
 78  Id. 
 79  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (“[T]he term ‘probable cause,’ according to its 
usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. . . . It imports 
a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. . . .” (quoting Locke, 11 U.S. at 
348)); see also id. at 235 (“Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s 
decision.  While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty 
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this may help explain in part why he appears so willing to accept police and 
prosecutor judgments of guilt as approximations of ground truth. 
Moreover, while the law ostensibly creates a presumption of innocence, 
it is widely recognized, both as a matter of theory and empirics, that 
prosecutors are actually aided by a presumption of guilt, at least once the 
first bits of evidence are introduced,80 which makes proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt far less daunting.81  Nearly fifty years ago, in his classic 
work modeling the criminal justice system, Herbert Packer observed, “[t]he 
presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal 
efficiently with large numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands.”82 
Surveys of prosecutors confirm that more than half do not presume that a 
person is innocent until proven guilty, and that “[m]any believe that once an 
accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt has been determined by the screening 
processes of the police and prosecutor.”83  Michael Saks and Michael 
Risinger note that “[s]ome evidence exists to suggest that jurors set their 
probabilities lower than they think they do,” and that jurors might actually 
start with “assumptions close to zero (innocence), but to which they attach[] 
very little weight, so that the presumption of innocence [is] abandoned as 
soon as the first piece of inculpatory evidence [is] presented.”84  Daniel 
Givelber explains: “Jurors apparently do not listen, evaluate and deliberate 
on the assumption that the defendant is innocent unless the government 
proves otherwise.  Rather, jurors take the logical position that they are in 
equipoise concerning the defendant’s guilt and will await the presentation of 
evidence before reaching a verdict.”85  Still others have argued that the 
reasonable doubt instruction, as currently formulated in most jurisdictions, 
is significantly weaker than as first developed at common law86 and is 
 
corresponding to ‘probable cause’ may not be helpful, it is clear that ‘only the probability, 
and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’” 
(quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419)). 
 80  Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt, 
Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2003) 
(citing Thomas M. Ostrom, Carol Werner & Michael J. Saks, An Integration Theory Analysis 
of Jurors’ Presumptions of Guilt or Innocence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436 
(1978)).   
 81  See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We 
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1326 (1997); BOAZ SANGERO, 
SAFETY FROM FALSE CONVICTIONS 68, 72–73 (2016); John Baldwin, Police Interrogation: 
What Are the Rules of the Game?, in SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 67 (David Morgan & Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds., 1994). 
 82  HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160 (1968). 
 83  George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 112 
(1975). 
 84  Saks & Risinger, supra note 80, at 1056. 
 85  Givelber, supra note 81, at 1372. 
 86  See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the 
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sometimes misunderstood by juries as weaker than the law requires.87  The 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is not likely to have the overwhelming 
effects Professor Laudan attributes to it. 
Other reasons exist as well for doubting that the reasonable doubt 
standard is forcing prosecutors to dismiss charges against actually guilty 
people on a massive scale.  Law and economics scholars contend that, when 
a prosecutor believes in an individual’s guilt but has proof problems, her 
response is likely not to dismiss the case outright, but rather to engage in 
bargaining by reducing the charges or the sentence, discounting either or 
both by the perceived likelihood of an acquittal.88  Or worse, the prosecutor 
with a weak hand but a firm belief in guilt might be inclined to bend the 
rules, deliberately or unwittingly, in ways designed to ensure a conviction, 
such as by failing to recognize Brady material, permitting use of a suggestive 
eyewitness identification procedure, or overzealously coaching witnesses.89  
To a prosecutor who believes in the accused’s guilt, the only outcome that 
will be seen as serving justice is a conviction, and so she will be highly 
motivated to find some way to achieve that outcome, despite proof 
problems.90 
Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in Gould et al.’s empirical 
study of the causes of wrongful convictions.  Professor Gould and his 
colleagues found that, among the factors that are significantly correlated with 
false convictions is a prosecutor’s weak case.91  In at least some cases where 
prosecutors might have doubts about their ability to meet the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard, therefore, the weak evidence and high standard 
did not combine to produce dismissals, but wrongful convictions.  Gould et 
al. hypothesized that this could be because: 
 
 
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1165, 1170 (2003) (arguing that the proof required to convict has shifted from a “certainty” 
standard to a much weaker one, in which juries are instructed to acquit only if they can identify 
reasonable doubts, defined as specific and articulable doubts). 
 87  Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt 
About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1999) (finding inconsistency and confusion 
among jurors, including that some jurors understand the reasonable doubt standard to be less 
rigorous than civil standards, depending on the wording of the instruction); Elisabeth 
Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in 
Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769, 774–78 (2000) 
(discussing empirical studies on the effect of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard). 
 88  See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 89  See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 
550, 559-62 (1987). 
 90  Id. at 554. 
 91  Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard Leo & Joseph Young, Predicting Erroneous 
Convictions: A Social Science Approach to Miscarriage of Justice, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 491, 
494, 501–02.  
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Weak facts may also encourage prosecutors to engage in certain 
behaviors designed to bolster the case, which our statistics show 
help predict an erroneous conviction. In several of our erroneous 
convictions, a prosecutor, convinced of the defendant’s guilt 
despite a lack of conclusive proof, failed to recognize and turn 
over exculpatory evidence or enlisted a snitch or other non-
eyewitness to provide dubious corroborating testimony. These 
types of actions compound, rather than rectify, previous errors or 
misconduct in the case.92 
 
The high rate of plea bargaining in this country (more than 95% of all 
convictions are obtained by pleas93), along with considerable empirical and 
anecdotal evidence, further suggests that prosecutors confronted with the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and weak evidence are making hard-
to-refuse plea offers rather than just dismissing cases.94  Albert Alschuler 
describes it this way: 
 
Convicting defendants who would be acquitted at trial is one of 
the principal goals of plea bargaining. “Half a loaf is better than 
none,” prosecutors say. “When we have a weak case for any 
reason, we’ll reduce to almost anything rather than lose.” If the 
correlation between “weak cases” and actual innocence is better 
than random, plea bargaining surely “convict[s] defendants who 
are in fact innocent (and would be acquitted [at trial]).”95 
 
This is what Professor Alschuler calls “odds bargaining”: bargaining “to 
ensure conviction in doubtful cases.”96  And if it occurs with any 
frequency—which it surely does—it undermines Professor Laudan’s thesis 
that the reasonable doubt standard is forcing prosecutors to dismiss cases 
against factually guilty defendants in alarming numbers. 
 
 92  Id. at 501.  
 93  In 2012, out of 87,908 cases in federal district court that resulted in a conviction, 
85,774 (97.757%) were the result of a plea (85,640 guilty pleas and 134 nolo contendere 
pleas).  MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 2012-STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl. 4.2 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/p
df/fjs12st.pdf. 
 94  New empirical research, involving analysis of actual case files from two New York 
prosecutors’ offices, reveals, among other things, that among all defendants, those who denied 
guilt but ultimately took a plea deal received “the largest-sized plea discounts when they did 
plea.”  Allison D. Redlich, Shi Yan, Robert J. Norris & Shawn D. Bushway, The Influence of 
Confessions on Guilty Pleas and Plea Discounts, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 10 (2017), 
available online first, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000144 . 
 95  Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. 
REV. 940, 940 (2015) (emphasis in original). 
 96  Id. 
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As a stark illustration of this, consider cases in which innocence 
advocacy organizations have marshaled strong new evidence of innocence 
(strong enough, at least, to meet the very high hurdles for overturning a 
conviction97).  Prosecutors often respond not by dismissing the cases, but by 
offering plea bargains too good to turn down—often, remarkably, “time 
served” even on serious homicide charges.98  Viewing this through an “odds 
bargaining” or law-and-economics lens suggests that prosecutors in these 
cases must recognize that the evidence is extraordinarily weak—and that 
indeed the accused might be (or even likely is) innocent.  Law and economics 
theory contends that rational prosecutors and defendants engaged in plea-
bargaining will start with an expected sentencing outcome in a case and 
discount it by the likelihood of acquittal.99  That is to say, the literature 
predicts that parties strike plea bargains in the shadow of expected trial 
outcomes.  The parties forecast the expected sentence after trial, discount it 
by the probability of acquittal, and offer some proportional discount.  Hence, 
a prosecutor will offer a deal that is greater than or equal to his or her 
expected value of the trial, and the defendant will accept it if it is less than 
or equal to his or her expected value of the trial.  So, for example, in simple 
terms, if the expected sentence after trial is 20 years, and the probability of 
conviction at trial is .8, both parties will see a plea bargain of 16 years as a 
 
 97  See Garrett, supra note 55, at 128-30 (describing the obstacles to overturning 
convictions, even in cases where the defendant was actually innocent); Daniel Medwed, Up 
the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA 
Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (2005). 
 98  See, e.g., Megan Rose, The Deal Prosecutors Offer When They Have No Cards Left to 
Play, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/what-
does-an-innocent-man-have-to-do-to-go-free-plead-guilty/539001/ (noting that “in Baltimore 
City and County alone—two separate jurisdictions with their own state’s attorneys—
ProPublica identified at least 10 cases in the last 19 years in which defendants with viable 
innocence claims ended up signing Alford pleas or time-served deals. In each case, 
exculpatory evidence was uncovered, persuasive enough to garner new trials, evidentiary 
hearings, or writs of actual innocence”); Facing Life: The Retrial of Evan Zimmerman, (A&E 
Television Networks 2006) (chronicling how, after Evan Zimmerman, a Wisconsin man who 
had served just three years of a life sentence for murder, was offered a plea bargain to time 
served after his conviction was vacated based on new evidence of innocence—evidence that 
ultimately forced the prosecutor to dismiss all charges with prejudice when Zimmerman 
refused to take the plea deal). 
 99  See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV 920 
(2016); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 
289, 295–96 (1983); Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social 
Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 753–55 (1983); Williams M. Landes, An Economic Analysis 
of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser. 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Louis 
M. Natali, Jr., Plea Bargaining in the Free Enterprise System, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 61 (1971); 
Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
713, 713–14 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 775–79 (8th ed. 
2011). 
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rational choice.  While this is obviously a grossly simplified and incomplete 
description of what happens in plea bargaining,100 there is at least enough 
truth to it101 to suggest that in many of these “innocence” cases, prosecutors 
recognize that the chances of conviction are virtually zero.  Yet they are not 
dismissing these cases.  Instead, they offer deals that are as close to no-cost 
to the defendants as possible (time served), thereby making it difficult for 
even the most risk-tolerant defendant to turn it down. Professor Laudan’s 
assumption that prosecutors handling cases in which they believe in guilt to 
some degree, but cannot meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, will 
uniformly dismiss those cases cannot be reconciled with this reality. 
Given these possibilities—indeed realities—it is odd that Professor 
Laudan would hang his argument on assumptions that, of all the features in 
the criminal justice system, it is the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
that is most responsible for creating error and victimization.  Not only is 
there no reason to believe that the reasonable doubt standard is working 
considerable mischief, one cannot conclude, as does Professor Laudan, that 
prosecutorial dismissals must reflect some significant rate of false negatives, 
especially anything as large and specific as the 40% rate Professor Laudan 
derives from it. 
In the end, while it would be useful to know rates of error, we simply 
cannot know those rates across crime categories and jurisdictions in any 
meaningful way, because we do not have anything close to perfect access to 
information; all we have is human judgment.  Hence, to focus on error rates 
is to ask the wrong question, and indeed begs error in the analysis by reliance 
on what can be little more than guesswork.  The focus instead must be on 
how to improve the efficacy of investigations and the diagnosticity of trials, 
regardless of what the error rate might be. This is a point to which I will 
return later in this piece. 
IV. ERRORS IN WEIGHING HARMS 
Note that the Laudan Algorithm, entirely apart from any questions 
about methodology for estimating victimization rates, counts all 
victimizations as of equal value.  To Professor Laudan, the harm 
victimization by a wrongful conviction is exactly the same as the harm 
caused by every recidivist’s violent crime.  That is how he comes up with his 
 
 100  See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV 2548 (2004). 
 101  Indeed, there is empirical evidence to support the theory.  See Shawn D. Bushway & 
Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” a Mirage?, 28 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2012); Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich & Robert 
J. Norris, An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial,” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 
723 (2014). 
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ratio of 2.2 to 1.2—he says every false conviction creates 2.2 victimizations, 
and every false acquittal creates 1.2, with each type of victimization worth 
exactly the same.  But is that really true? Simply counting repeat offenses, 
even repeat violent offenses, masks wide variations in conduct and harm.  A 
violent crime might be anything from premeditated murder to a barroom 
tussle, or an unwanted shove or slap. Indeed, there is good reason to believe 
that the vast majority of violent offenses that Professor Laudan counts as of 
full value—a “1” in his formula—are of the lesser types—often more 
annoyances and insults than real threats to community well-being.  That is 
likely a fairer assessment of what the large number of probation dispositions 
or comparatively short sentences that Professor Laudan references mean, 
rather than Professor Laudan’s assessment that, even in our uniquely 
punitive society with unparalleled levels of incarceration, the sentences that 
judges impose are soft. 
A. The Harms from False Negatives 
Professor Laudan’s equation also falters because he assumes that every 
conviction of a guilty person is an unqualified good, because it reduces the 
risk other victimization.  For some offenses—murder and violent sexual 
offenses, for example—few would disagree that every conviction is 
desirable.  But there is a wide array of crimes, even violent crimes, for which 
conviction and imprisonment might sometimes cause more victimization 
than they would prevent.  Murder and rape convictions make up only a very 
small proportion of all criminal convictions—even of all convictions for 
violent crimes—together only about 2% of all felony convictions, and a 
much smaller percentage of all crimes.102  For many crimes, imprisonment 
in some circumstances likely increases the risk of recidivating, which may 
in turn generate other crimes.  As Cecelia Klingele notes, “[g]iven the social 
disruption, isolation, and substandard conditions that define the experience 
of imprisonment in America today, it is no surprise that people who are 
incarcerated are at a higher risk of being re-incarcerated in the future.”103  
Marzin Zalman puts it this way: “All the anti-Blackstonians, especially 
Allen/Laudan and Cassell, emphasize the costs of crime.  But any analysis 
of system effectiveness and system errors needs to consider . . . the effects 
or costs of crime control as well.104 
 
 102  Gross & O’Brien, supra note 45, at 938 (citing Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. 
Langan, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2000, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATISTICS 2 tbl. 1 (2003)). 
 103  Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 537, 548 (2015). 
 104  Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians: Thinking About Different Strokes, 48 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1319 (2017). 
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Indeed, while Professor Laudan and the other anti-Blackstonians 
employ simple calculations of the crime-suppressing effects of 
imprisonment (and conversely, the crime-inducing effects of every failure to 
convict the guilty), their analysis is remarkably one-dimensional and blind 
to the myriad factors that contribute to crime.  More nuanced, deeper 
analyses, such as the comprehensive review recently completed by the 
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, make clear 
that the numbers are neither as clear nor as dramatic as Professor Laudan 
would have it.  Indeed, the NRC report concludes, contrary to the grand 
claims made by Professor Laudan, that “[m]ost studies estimate the crime-
reducing effect of incarceration to be small.”105 
Additionally, Professor Laudan’s calculation depends on offender 
uniformity—the notion that every guilty individual accused of a crime is just 
as likely as the next to commit future crimes. But that assumption too is 
unwarranted, and skews the crime-prevention value of each additional 
conviction in ways designed to support Professor Laudan’s thesis.  As the 
NRC observed, recidivism rates for accused individuals are not uniform, but 
subject to “stochastic selectivity:” High-rate offenders are more likely to be 
apprehended and convicted than less frequent offenders, simply because 
their behavior exposes them to jeopardy more frequently.  Accordingly, 
“they will be represented in prison disproportionately relative to their 
representation in the population of nonincarcerated offenders.”106  As 
Professor Zalman observes, therefore, “beyond a certain point, incarcerating 
more offenders is likely to capture low-rate offenders resulting in 
diminishing crime-reduction returns for every person incarcerated and for 
every year of incarceration.”107  Professor Laudan’s simple equation ignores 
this reality, and thereby overstates the value of incrementally convicting and 
imprisoning more people. 
Moreover, the social dislocation and disruption occasioned by high 
levels of incarceration represents another cost of conviction of the guilty that 
Professor Laudan’s equation entirely overlooks. Imprisonment deprives 
children and spouses of their parents and partners,108 and at high-enough 
 
 105  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 155 (Jeremy 
Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014). 
 106  Id. at 142–43. 
 107  Zalman, supra note 104, at 1340. 
 108  A robust body of literature in sociology and criminology empirically shows a large 
negative effect of parental incarceration on life course outcomes for children.  See Holly 
Foster & John Hagan, Maternal and Paternal Imprisonment and Children’s Social Exclusion 
in Young Adulthood, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016); Christopher Wildeman, 
Signe Hald Andersen, Hedwig Lee, & Kristian Bernt Karlson, Parental Incarceration and 
Child Mortality in Denmark, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 428 (2014); Holly Foster & John 
Hagan, Incarceration and Intergenerational Social Exclusion, 54 SOC. PROBLEMS 399 (2007); 
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levels (as it is in many, especially urban, neighborhoods), imperils entire 
communities.  Professor Klingele explains: 
 
Communities are also negatively affected by mass imprisonment. 
A host of formal and informal collateral consequences—including 
disenfranchisement, deportation, exclusion from public housing, 
and limitations on employment licensing—await those who have 
been incarcerated, making them less productive parents and 
citizens when they return home. In places with disproportionately 
high rates of incarceration, traditional family structures are 
weakened, democratic power is diluted, and neighborhoods are 
destabilized.109 
 
For many crimes, some such disruption is unavoidable and most would agree 
it is worth the cost, but that simply is not so for all offenders and all crimes, 
even all violent crimes.  To treat all offending, even all violent offending, as 
equally well-served by conviction and imprisonment—as a “1” in Professor 
Laudan’s calculus—therefore also defies reason and undermines the utility 
of Professor Laudan’s project. 
 
 
Christopher Wildeman & Bruce Western, Incarceration in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN 157 (2010), https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_
02_08.pdf; Sytske Besemer et al., The Relationship Between Parental Imprisonment and 
Offspring Offending in England and the Netherlands, 51 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 413 (2011).  
This includes negative academic outcomes.  See Rosa Minhyo Cho, Impact of Maternal 
Imprisonment on Children’s Probability of Grade Retention, 20 J. URBAN ECON. 11 (2009); 
Rosa Minhyo Cho, Maternal Incarceration and Children’s Adolescent Outcomes: Timing and 
Dosage, 84 SOC. SERV. REV. 257 (2010); Foster & Hagan, supra; Wildeman et al., supra; 
Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, Parental Imprisonment: Effects on Boys’ Antisocial 
Behaviour and Delinquency Through the Life-Course, 46 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 
1269 (2005); Joseph Murray, David P. Farrington & Ivana Sekol, Children’s Antisocial 
Behavior, Mental Health, Drug Use, and Educational Performance After Parental 
Incarceration: A Systematic Review and MetMeta-Analysis, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 175 (2012); 
Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration and Children’s Physically Aggressive 
Behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, 889 SOC. FORCES 
285 (2010).  But see Stephen B. Billings, Parental Arrest, Incarceration and the Outcomes of 
Their Children (Mar. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034539 
(finding that parental arrest coincides with negative outcomes for children, but that 
incarceration of a parent may have short-term benefits for children as a result of removing 
negative role models from the child’s home environment). 
 109  Klingele, supra note 103, at 549 (citing TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: 
HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007)); JEFF 
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 157–63 (2006); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, 
Representation, and the Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 
1148–49 (2004); Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 58 (Marc Mauer 
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)). 
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Finally, this discussion would be incomplete without at least noting the 
financial cost of mass incarceration.  Professor Laudan’s proposal—to lock 
up more people, and for longer—is oblivious to the fiscal crises facing most 
jurisdictions today caused in part by our very high rates of incarceration.  
Across this country, in the last decade or so, state after state has begun to 
search for ways to reduce incarceration rates because they simply cannot 
afford to continue to fund mass incarceration at current levels, let alone the 
enormously increased levels Professor Laudan proposes.110  The reality is, 
we cannot imprison our way out of crime. What we need are other solutions.  
For reasons that are not clear, Professor Laudan focuses single-mindedly on 
imprisonment as the only solution to crime, without any consideration of 
alternative approaches that might be more effective and less costly in both 
human and financial terms. 
B. The Harms from False Convictions 
On the other side of the equation, false convictions also come in all 
degrees, from convictions for petty misdemeanors to capital murder.  The 
vast majority of the exonerations we know about are of the more serious 
type—indeed, 99% of the DNA exonerations involve murder, rape, or rape-
murder.111  There is good reason to believe, however, that even far more false 
convictions arise in petty crimes and various misdemeanor cases112 and 
lower-level felonies or offenses that result in short or no prison sentences.  
But the reality is that such injustices are rarely discovered, because no 
resources are spent on trying to find and correct them.  As Professors Gross 
and O’Brien have observed, these small-case wrongful convictions are 
almost surely far more numerous than the serious-crime wrongful 
convictions that we know about, yet we know almost nothing about them.113 
 
 110  See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second 
Look” and other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing 
Revision, 42 TOLEDO L. REV. 859, 859 (2011) (“After two decades of escalating prison 
populations, jurisdictions throughout the country are beginning to experience the significant 
ramifications of globally-unparalleled rates of confinement.  The high cost of incarceration, 
coupled with the disproportionate burden on minority communities, has led many 
jurisdictions to question whether prison terms should be so frequently and indiscriminately 
imposed, and whether they should be so long.”); Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early 
Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415 (2012). 
 111  Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 55, at 73. 
 112  See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, Misdemeanors, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A 
REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 1 (Erik Luna ed., 2018) 
(“Enormous, fast, and highly informal, the [misdemeanor] system sweeps up and processes 
millions of people in ways that diverge wildly from traditional criminal justice ideals.  People 
often do not get a lawyer; evidence is rarely scrutinized; proceedings can take mere minutes.  
Most people plead guilty, typically very quickly.  Many convictions are inaccurate; many 
violate the Constitution.”). 
 113  Gross & O’Brien, supra note 45, at 938. 
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Nonetheless, it is almost certainly true that most, if not all, false 
convictions—even in the misdemeanor cases—are costly and profoundly 
damaging, to a degree that cannot be said of all victimization of crimes, even 
violent crimes.  Professor Laudan’s 1-1 ratio of the cost of a false conviction 
to the wrongly convicted individual and the cost of every crime victimization 
ignores that, regardless of the sentence imposed, every prosecution and every 
conviction is a devastating experience.  The stress of accusation alone is 
overwhelming.  The expense of defense can be enormous.  The loss of one’s 
good name, of friendships and family relationships, of employment, of 
savings, of the ability to find future employment and housing, and the 
corrosive effects of being marginalized and disbelieved by one’s own 
government—all are regular features of false convictions, regardless of the 
sentence imposed.114  And then consider the enormous losses occasioned by 
imprisonment.  Beyond those direct punishments, the collateral 
consequences of convictions tally literally in the thousands.115  For those 
wrongly convicted who have prior (or subsequent) valid convictions, those 
consequences might be marginally less significant, but the sense of injustice 
attendant to being falsely accused and convicted still works unmeasurable 
harm. A criminal conviction, especially a felony conviction, marks a person 
for life, making it enormously difficult to obtain employment, housing, and 
education. 
One way to assess this is to note that, given all these harms, most of us, 
no doubt, if given the choice between being victimized by all but the most 
serious crimes, or being wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for any length 
of time, would elect the former rather than the latter.116 Either possibility is 
of course horrible, but for many if not most crime victims, recovery in a 
supportive community is largely possible, even likely. The same simply 
 
 114  For some of the literature on the crushing emotional harms caused by wrongful 
convictions of the innocent, see Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, The Burden of 
Innocence: Coping with a Wrongful Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. 
JUST. 139 (2004); Rashaan A. DeShay, “A Lot of People Go Insane Behind That”: Coping 
with the Trauma of Being Wrongfully Convicted, 29 CRIM. JUST. STUD.: A CRITICAL J. OF 
CRIME, L. & SOC’Y 189 (2004); Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful 
Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004). 
 115  See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2016). 
 116  On this point, it is worth noting that Professor Laudan builds his argument, equating 
every wrongful conviction with every violent crime victimization, on data suggesting that in 
2008 1.7 million violent crimes were committed in the United States.  But his own data shows 
that, of those 1.7 million violent crimes, just over 105,000—or just 6% of the total—involved 
murder or rape.  The remaining 94% (1.6 million of the 1.7 million) of the violent crimes 
comprised armed robbery, aggravated assault, and “other” crimes (this latter category alone 
accounting for 330,000 crimes, more than 3 times as many as the rapes and murders)—the 
types that might be serious, but also can be and often are much less threatening.  LAUDAN, 
supra note 1, at 48 tbl. 4. 
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cannot be said of wrongful convictions. 
Professor Laudan predicts a different preference for most people, 
asking rhetorically, “After all, how many of us would say that they would 
prefer to have been murdered rather than having been sentenced to 12 years 
in prison for a murder we didn’t commit? Who would rather have been raped 
with violence than have been falsely convicted of rape and receiving the 
average 6-year sentence for that crime?”117 But Professor Laudan can only 
make that argument by focusing on the most violent types of crimes—
particularly murders and “violent rapes.” For many of those crimes, 
Professor Laudan is likely correct. For less serious violent crimes, including 
armed robbery and aggravated assault, Professor Laudan then suggests the 
picture is not much different because he says that 38% of armed robberies 
and 30% of aggravated assaults resulted in serious injuries.118  Yet, as noted, 
murders compose only a miniscule proportion of all crime in America, and 
rapes not much more119—even less if limited to the more physically injurious 
types of assaults that Professor Laudan apparently means by “violent rapes.”  
And even the “serious injuries” he references among the armed robbery and 
aggravated assault cases will often, if not usually, be the type of injury from 
which one can recover.  Indeed, Professor Laudan’s data show that, by far, 
the most significant reason that most violent crimes do not produce 
convictions is because the victims don’t even bother to report them.  Of the 
1.7 million violent crimes he counts in 2008, about half of the crimes were 
never reported to police.120  Apparently, for a huge proportion of violent 
crime victims, the experience, for whatever reason, didn’t warrant a call to 
the police.  The costs between all of these crimes and wrongful convictions 
cannot be simplistically counted as equal. 
Professor Laudan suggests that the costs of false convictions are further 
diminished because “a non-trivial number of those false positives will be 
exonerated by the activities of Innocence Projects and by exoneration 
hearings.”121  Because he estimates a false conviction rate of about 3%, he 
contends that “approximately 2-3% of convictions for violent crimes lead to 
exonerations for false positives, meaning release from prison”122  But even 
if Professor Laudan’s false conviction rate is correct, that is a theoretical or 
estimated rate, not a rate at which innocent people are actually exonerated.  
 
 117  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 74. 
 118  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 75. 
 119  According to the FBI, in 2013, of more than 9 million total arrests in the United States, 
8,383, or 0.0009%, were for murder, and 13,515, or 0.001%, were for sexual assaults of all 
types.  FBI Crim. Just. Info. Servs. Div., Crime in the United States 2013, FBI (2013), https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-43. 
 120  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 49, 67. 
 121  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 75. 
 122  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 75.  
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Only a small fraction of the pool of individuals hypothesized to be innocent 
are actually exonerated each year; most of the innocents continue to languish 
in prison, unable to muster the combination of new evidence, legal 
assistance, access to a court, and simple good luck required for vindication.  
Professor Laudan’s argument, equating the theoretical false conviction rate 
with the exoneration rate, reinforces both the weakness of his claims and 
Professor Risinger’s observation that Professors Laudan’s (and Allen’s) data 
“seem to have been selected to make their readership . . . feel more 
threatened, so those readers will be more open to their message.”123 
It seems quite likely, therefore, that the harm caused by the average 
false conviction is much more significant than the harm caused by the 
average false acquittal.  Of course, the opposite could also be true, at least 
for some offenses, although I doubt for most.  But even if one is unconvinced 
about the greater harms from wrongful conviction, the point remains, at 
bottom we just don’t know with any certainty—and how could we, since the 
harms involved defy quantification?  Hence, it is overly simplistic, and 
indeed futile, to try to create a mathematical formula for quantifying harms 
that are as widespread, divergent, individualized, and unknowable as the 
harms from false convictions and false acquittals.  But what we can be pretty 
sure of is that there is no reason to assume the harms fit a neat ratio of 1 to 
1.124  That alone dooms Professor Laudan’s enterprise. 
C. Balancing Harms Against Individual Justice 
Professor Laudan’s approach flounders for another, related reason as 
well.  He attempts a mathematical balancing of harms in the aggregate, and 
then from there hopes to settle on a burden of proof that will apply in 
individual cases.  But justice as dispensed in the courts, especially in criminal 
courts, is about fairness to the individual litigants.  In this sense, Professor 
Laudan’s mathematical approach proves far too much, for, if pushed to its 
logical extreme, it would generate scenarios in which aggregate risks for 
certain categories of individuals might be deemed so serious (in terms of 
risks of false acquittals) as to warrant putting the burden of proof on the 
accused, and even making it a high burden.125  But, despite the risk that the 
 
 123  Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 32, at 1016. 
 124  Professor Cassell, in his contribution to this Symposium, suggests that, because of 
these uncertainties, I just “throw up” my hands.  Cassell, infra note 207, at 1478.  But my 
response is not to despair in the way Professor Cassell suggests.  Instead, as discussed infra 
Part VI, my response is to focus on what we can know, and how that can lead us to improve 
the overall functioning of the system, to simultaneously reduce failures to convict the guilty 
and false conviction of the innocent.  My response, I believe, is one that is simultaneously 
reality-based and more attentive to reform possibilities that can actually make the system 
better. 
 125  Professor Risinger has also previously recognized this problem: “[B]y the[] logic [of 
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community may perceive from some unpopular individuals, justice requires 
considering individual guilt, not some form of group liability (even if based 
on individual characteristics, like prior offenses).  Professor Corrado makes 
this point this way: 
 
[Settling on a burden of proof] is a matter of costs, but the standard 
(at least in the courtroom) does not involve comparing costs.  It 
does not involve comparing the cost of a guilty verdict with the 
cost of a not guilty verdict, for example. In the case of punishment, 
there is a prior determination, namely that the individual is not to 
be sacrificed merely for the good of the community, and that 
something more is required.  That is, the state is not being asked 
to show that in general the costs of a mistaken verdict of not guilty 
vastly outweigh the costs of a mistaken guilty verdict.  Instead, 
given the immense cost for the defendant of a guilty verdict, 
mistaken or not, and the moral presumption that human beings are 
not to be used by the state without justification, the only 
comparison is between the evidence for guilt and the evidence 
against guilt.  Were it otherwise, we would run into the most 
extreme form of the problem that punishing the innocent raises for 
the justification of punishment: if the costs of a verdict of not 
guilty were in general too high, the burden would be on the—
possibly innocent—defendant to prove his innocence, and the 
burden might be set quite high, ensuring that innocent defendants 
could be sacrificed to the good of the community.126 
 
In a related way, when comparing harms at the individual case level—
the level at which justice is dispensed—there is still another reason why false 
convictions are far worse than false acquittals.  Every false conviction is 
guaranteed to inflict substantial harm on an individual; the harm to the 
innocent individual is by its very nature a certainty, a given.  But the harms—
as measured by Professor Laudan (by which he means future victimization 
of innocent people) from false acquittals in individual cases are speculative 
at best.  While Professor Laudan claims that on average a factually guilty 
person who is acquitted will commit 1.2 additional crimes, even if accurate 
and meaningful, that is an average.  It is far from certain that any given 
factually-guilty-but-acquitted individual will commit any additional crimes 
at all (while, of course, he or she might commit many).  To reiterate, then, 
when dispensing justice to individuals, the harm from wrongly convicting an 
 
Allen and Laudan’s] position, there would seem to be no limit to the drop in the standard of 
proof that could be justified, all the way to the preponderance, and even beyond . . . .” 
Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 32, at 1018. 
 126  Corrado, supra note 34, at 4. 
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innocent person is certain, but the harm to other potential crime victims from 
acquitting a factually guilty person is speculative and contingent.127  From a 
justice perspective, the two harms simply cannot be equated. 
V. TILTING AN ALREADY TILTED PLAYING FIELD 
A. Targeting Recidivists, Exacerbating Mass Incarceration 
As noted, ultimately Professor Laudan’s argument boils down to this: 
We don’t incarcerate enough people, or for long enough, at least when it 
comes to violent crimes.  At numerous points he makes this claim directly.128  
It is difficult, however, to reconcile that diagnosis and its ensuing 
prescription for more and longer imprisonment with the well-known facts.  
To begin, the United States already has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world—and it’s not even close.  The incarceration rate in the United States 
is seven times the rate of its Western European counterparts.129  And 
incarceration in the United States over the past few decades has exploded, 
leading to what is widely now recognized as a crisis of mass incarceration130 
in a system already “internationally infamous for its size and harshness.”131  
From 1977 to 2010, the number of individuals in state and federal prisons 
mushroomed from approximately 300,000 to more than 1.5 million.132  Yet 
we are not appreciably safer for it, especially in an international comparative 
sense. 
 
 127  I recognize that there are other harms one might attribute to a false acquittal, such as 
the failure to deliver a sense of justice to the victim of the given crime.  I do not mean to 
diminish those concerns, but do not count them in my analysis simply because Professor 
Laudan does not attempt to quantify such harms in his equation (how could he?), and it is his 
equation to which I am responding. 
 128  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix (arguing that it is wrong to believe “[t]he near-universal 
belief that we are incarcerating far too many criminals—a familiar cliché of modern American 
life” or “[t]he widely-held convention that we are locking serious criminals away in prison 
for unreasonably long stays”); LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 25 (arguing that “there are effective 
methods for lowering the rate of serious crimes.  Basically, these hinge on convicting and 
incarcerating a higher proportion of the guilty than we now convict.”) (emphasis in original); 
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 31 (“Where violent crimes are concerned, we should be 
incarcerating more of the guilty and locking them away in prison for longer venues.”). 
 129  Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality and the Future of 
Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009); Alfred Blumstein et al., Cross-
National Measures of Punitiveness, 33 CRIME & JUST. 347, 348–50 (2005). 
 130  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO 
REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2005). 
 131  NATAPOFF, supra note 112, at 1.  
 132  Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1016–17 (2013) (first citing LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2010 
3 tbl. 1 (2011); then citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND 
FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925–85 3 tbl. 2 (1986)). 
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While it can be hazardous to draw causal conclusions from comparative 
data, especially given the vast array of cultural, economic, political, and 
other differences that can contribute to crime rates, comparisons between 
demographically, culturally, and politically very similar states within the 
United States can be somewhat illuminating.  Wisconsin and Minnesota, for 
example, are often compared because of their many similarities.  That 
comparison suggests, at least to some extent, that more and longer 
imprisonment does not produce greater public safety, as promised by 
Professor Laudan.  Although the two states have nearly identical populations 
(approximately 5 million), and very similar demographics, geography, and 
cultures, Wisconsin imprisons two to 2.5 times as many people as does 
Minnesota: in 2008, Wisconsin had 23,000 people in its prisons, while 
Minnesota imprisoned only 9,000.133  Yet crime rates in the two states are 
nearly identical.134  Somehow, the reduction in crime that Professor Laudan 
promises from increased imprisonment has not materialized in 
Wisconsin135—despite the considerable human and financial cost to the state 
from that increased imprisonment. 
Lowering the burden of proof for repeat offenders is also not even 
necessary to achieve Professor Laudan’s goal of making it easier to imprison 
recidivists.  Common investigative heuristics, adjudicative practices, 
institutional imbalances, and the rules of evidence already take care of that.  
For the same reason that Professor Laudan wants to target repeat offenders, 
police and prosecutors are already predisposed to suspect the usual 
suspects—whether as a matter of convenience or motivation.  Repeat 
offenders are the people on police radar screens.  Police and prosecutors 
naturally target repeat players because they are the people whose 
fingerprints, DNA profiles, and mug photos are already available to link 
them—accurately or not—to crimes.136  Indeed, Professor Laudan and his 
frequent co-author Ronald Allen have previously recognized that prior 
 
 133  MICHAEL O’HEAR, WISCONSIN SENTENCING IN THE TOUGH-ON CRIME ERA: HOW 
JUDGES RETAINED POWER AND WHY MASS INCARCERATION HAPPENED ANYWAY 62, 89, 160–
61 (2017); Comparison of Wisconsin, Minnesota Prison Data Prompts Questions, TWIN 
CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.twincities.com/2010/04/28/comparison-
of-wisconsin-minnesota-prison-data-prompts-questions/ (updated Nov. 12, 2015). 
 134  Id.  
 135  See O’HEAR, supra note 133, at 160 (concluding Wisconsin and Minnesota data 
“suggest[] that Wisconsin’s dramatic divergence from Minnesota on the imprisonment front 
after the 1970s may have yielded few public safety benefits”). 
 136  For eyewitness identification procedures, for example, Gary Wells has explained how 
simply being included ins a photo array or lineup puts innocent people at risk of 
misidentification.  See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reform, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 615, 635 (2006).  Individuals with prior records are, of course, much more likely to 
have mug photos that are available for inclusion in photo arrays, or to be selected for inclusion 
in an identification procedure, simply because of the prior record. 
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record is already one of the strongest predictors of conviction that is 
available, regardless of whether the jury hears about the prior conviction or 
not; those without a prior conviction are about twice as likely to be acquitted 
as those with a prior record.137 
Beyond convenience, Professors Laudan and Allen have also 
previously hypothesized that one reason people with prior records are 
convicted at higher rates than those without “can be explained by the fact 
that police and prosecutors are keener on locking up serial felons”—and 
hence work harder to develop evidence against them.138  Empirical data 
supports this intuition.  The research on false confessions, for example, 
reveals that when police approach a suspect with a belief in guilt—a scenario 
that is more likely when the suspect has a prior record—they are more likely 
to engage in aggressive psychological interrogation tactics that make it much 
more likely that the suspect—whether guilty or innocent—will confess, will 
do so in convincing detail, and will appear guilty to observers.139 
Similar heuristics influence jury decision-making as well, predisposing 
juries to find guilt if the defendant has a prior record, even when they are 
ostensibly applying the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  Although the 
rules of evidence preclude the jury from hearing about prior records for some 
accused individuals—precisely because the rules recognize that the biasing 
heuristics can lead juries to convict not on the evidence but on assumptions 
that the accused is a bad person and hence for that reason is either likely 
guilty or is deserving of punishment whether he committed the particular 
crime at issue140—the rules also permit evidence of prior records to be 
admitted at trial under many circumstances.141  Despite rules ostensibly 
barring evidence of prior conduct to prove character or propensity, the rules 
permit evidence of other acts if offered to prove virtually anything other than 
 
 137  Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence 
and Other Mythos of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 493, 498 
(2011) (citing Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (2005)). 
 138  Id. at 517. 
 139  See, e.g., Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of Interrogation-Induced 
False Confession: Sources of Failure in Prevention and Detection, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC 
SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 47 (2013); Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: 
Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005), https://www.iiir
g.org/assets/Kassin-2005-Does-Innocence-Put-Innocents-at-Risk.pdf. 
 140  The Advisory Committee notes to FED. R. EVID. 404 explain the rationale for 
excluding character evidence: “Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be 
very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually 
happened on the particular occasion.  It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man 
to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the 
case shows actually happened.”  FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 2000 
amendment (quoting Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, 615 (1964)). 
 141  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. EVID. 609. 
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character—such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” and the like.142  
Courts have read those exceptions so expansively in criminal cases that they 
have nearly swallowed the rule.143  If the defendant testifies, the rules then 
generally permit impeachment with prior convictions.  The result is either 
the defendant suffers the prejudice attendant to spreading her bad character 
before the jury,144 or she refrains from exercising her right to testify and 
explain her innocence in order to prevent such impeachment.145 Either way, 
the defendant’s opportunities for vindication are diminished.146 
Other systemic factors also conspire against repeat players.  Those with 
a prior record are less likely to be granted bail, for example, or if granted 
bail, are likely to have it set too high for them to be able to post it.  Yet we 
know that inability to make bail impedes one’s ability to work with counsel 
to prepare a defense, make reparations to victims, or address treatment needs, 
thereby increasing the odds of conviction and/or the severity of 
 
 142  FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 143  See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30, 33–34 (Wis. 1998) (noting that the court 
of appeals in that case had “expressed concern that the supreme court and the court of appeals 
over the years have chipped away” at the rule against admitting other acts evidence); Ronald 
J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible Reasoning, 21 
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 133, 140 (2017) (noting that, despite rules that purport to exclude 
other acts evidence, most such character evidence is admitted at trial, as in practice “virtually 
all relevant evidence comes in”). 
 144  Considerable empirical research confirms that use of prior record to impeach a 
testifying defendant imposes a penalty on criminal defendants, and has a tendency to lead 
jurors to convict for legally impermissible character reasons. For an excellent summary of 
this research, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395 (2018).  
Interestingly, in the literature on this point, the lone noteworthy article that makes the contrary 
claim—that the empirical evidence on this point is “all over the map,” and that the prior-
record penalty is overstated—is authored by Professors Laudan and Allen.  See Allen & 
Laudan, supra note 2.  Professor Bellin, however, convincingly shows that the data Laudan 
and Allen rely upon to reach their startling conclusion is inapposite or distinguishable and 
that, accordingly, despite Laudan and Allen’s contrary claim, “[t]he empirical evidence from 
mock juror experiments is one-sided and clear. The studies suggest that the introduction of 
prior conviction evidence substantially damages defendants’ chances for acquittal, primarily 
through a legally prohibited ‘criminal propensity’ inference.” Bellin, supra note 144, at 406 
(footnote omitted). 
 145  See Bellin, supra note 144, at 146 (summarizing the social science literature showing 
that jurors punish defendants for declining to testify).  Professors Laudan & Allen also 
hypothesize that jurors likely infer a prior record whenever the defendant fails to introduce 
evidence of no prior convictions, and that this helps explain why jurors convict repeat 
offenders at a higher rate than those with clean records.  Allen & Laudan, supra note 2, at 
511–15. If correct, this adds even more reason why a prior record already works as a handicap 
to the repeat players, without officially lowering the burden of proof. 
 146  In an interesting simulation study, Professor Bellin found that, not only do jurors 
punish defendants for either having a prior record (the “prior offender penalty”) or for 
choosing not to testify (the “silence penalty”), but that the penalties are approximately equal. 
Bellin, supra note 144, at 415. 
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punishment.147  (Inability to make bail also has other negative consequences, 
even for those who are ultimately acquitted, including loss of jobs, housing, 
benefits, and placement of children and even increased recidivism.)148 
A prior record, therefore, inherently serves as a handicap in our 
criminal justice system, without any help from Professor Laudan’s proposal 
to tilt the scales even further.  Professor Laudan’s proposal—to deliberately 
stack the deck against those with prior convictions—thus promises to further 
imbalance the process and make it significantly more likely that innocent 
defendants with prior records are wrongly convicted. 
Data from the exoneration cases seems to bear out this reasoning.  Of 
the more-than 2,000 exonerees listed in the National Registry of 
exonerations, approximately 44% have some sort of prior record.149 Yet 
among the general population, a smaller proportion, approximately one-
third, have a prior record150—itself a staggeringly high figure on an 
international scale, but significantly lower than the rate among those who are 
wrongly convicted in the United States.  Thus, the data reveal that, while 
wrongful conviction can happen to anyone, those with a prior record are at a 
significantly higher risk of suffering such an injustice; the rate of exoneration 
is almost 50% higher for those with a criminal record than for those 
 
 147  See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986); Liana M. Goff, 
Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise of America’s Bail System, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 881, 
900 (2017) (“Being [denied bail] increases the likelihood that individuals will commit future 
crimes, substantially impacts defendants’ ability to assist attorneys in mounting competent 
defenses, and encourages plea bargains, all of which increase the likelihood that the accused 
will be convicted, imprisoned, and subjected to an extended deprivation of liberty and justice 
as a sentenced inmate.”) (citing MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 
A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115 (2012) (“[A] decade of criminal cases 
were analyzed, revealing that in New York City, 50% of bailed nonfelony defendants were 
convicted, compared with 92% of those jailed pending trial.  Among those convicted, only 
10% of the bailed defendants received prison sentences, compared with 84% of defendants 
who spent the entire pretrial period behind bars.”)); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan 
Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. 
REV. 711 (2017); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (2005) (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.2(c) (2d ed. 1999) (“There is little reason to doubt the proposition 
that pretrial detention has a significant adverse impact upon the ability of a defendant to 
vindicate himself at trial.”)); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 527–28 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that bail “facilitates preparation of a defense and 
prevents incarceration of a possibly innocent person”).  
 148  Jeffrey A. Kremers, Milwaukee Moves Away From Money Bail System, WIS. LAWYER, 
(June 2017), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx
?Volume=90&Issue=6&ArticleID=25667. 
 149  Email from Maurice Possley to author (on file with author). 
 150  Half in Ten & The Sentencing Project, Americans with Criminal Records (2015), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-
Records-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Profile.pdf. 
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without.151 
And, of course, all of this is especially true with regard to the poor, the 
mentally ill, and racial minorities.  It is well-known that “[c]ommunities of 
color; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals; and people with 
histories of abuse or mental illness are disproportionately affected” by the 
criminal justice system.152  Because these groups—already ensnared in the 
criminal justice system at disproportionate rates—will therefore also be even 
more over-represented among those who are wrongly convicted,153 Professor 
Laudan’s proposal has the additional consequence of exacerbating these very 
problematic disparities in the criminal justice system.154  I need not recount 
the myriad ways that those disparities undermine respect for the law, create 
tensions between the system (including most visibly the police) and 
communities of color, and destabilize whole communities.  This adds yet 
another reason why Professor Laudan’s simple equation overlooks many of 
the intangible and uncountable harms attributable to wrongful convictions.  
It also underscores Professor Zalman’s observation that “[a] startling 
omission in the anti-Blackstonians’ analyses is race.  In their highly abstract 
world not only are human actors like unchanging monads but they are 
colorless.”155 
B. Tilting the Procedural Rules at Trial 
When cases go to trial, the rules of the game can further make 
exoneration of the innocent difficult. In this regard, Professor Laudan has it 
exactly backwards when he contends that “[l]egislators and appellate courts 
over the years have made it increasingly difficult to identify guilty 
defendants” by essentially stacking the deck at trial in the defendant’s 
favor.156  Among the rules that Professor Laudan argues give the defendant 
an advantage (and obscure the truth) are rules that exclude: the fruits of 
Fourth Amendment violations;157 the defendant’s prior record;158 “‘unfairly 
 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Again, the data from the wrongful conviction cases bear this out. Among the first 200 
DNA exonerations, 62% were black, and a combined 71% were black or Hispanic (compared 
to 29% for whites)—well beyond their proportion of either the general population or even the 
prison population.  Garrett, supra note 55, at 66.  
 154  New empirical research shows that indeed the massive increase in imprisonment rates 
from 1978 through 1999 produced a huge and disproportionate increase in the incarceration 
rate for black people.  Walter Enders, Paul Pecorino & Anne-Charlotte Souto, Racial Disarity 
in U.S. Imprisonment Across States and Over Time (Oct. 13, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3053020. 
 155  Zalman, supra note 104. 
 156  LAUDAN, supra note 1. 
 157  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 113. 
 158  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114. 
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prejudicial, relevant evidence;”159 “relevant, hearsay evidence;”160 evidence 
about the character of the defendant;161 non-Mirandized confessions;162 
evidence that the defendant refused to talk with the police after they had 
advised him that he had the right to remain silent;163 and privileged evidence 
(statements from “doctors, clergy, psychiatrists, lawyers, social workers, 
counselors”).164  Among the procedural asymmetries that Professor Laudan 
says favor the defendant are the bar against the prosecution’s appeal of 
acquittals;165 the sequence at trial, which permits the defendant “to present 
his case and his testimony after the prosecution rests its case  . . . thereby 
being able to shape his testimony to his advantage;”166 rules that permit the 
defendant to “present character evidence to impeach prosecution witnesses 
while still blocking the admissibility of evidence of his own character (if he 
does not testify);”167 the statute of limitations that bars initiation of a case 
after a certain period of time;168 asymmetry in the parties’ discovery 
obligations and rights;169 rules that permit the exclusion of eyewitness 
identification evidence that in some jurisdictions have become more 
amenable to excluding evidence than in the past;170 and others.  Professor 
Laudan also notes that there are some features of the criminal process that 
favor the prosecution—including the prosecution’s far greater resources, 
discretion in shaping the charges, ability to make deals with accomplices or 
grant immunity for testimony, and the defendant’s inability to compel 
victims (or any witness for that matter) to agree to a pretrial interview.171  
But he gives these advantages little ink, and concludes, curiously, that they 
pale in comparison to defense advantages. 
 
 
 159  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403). 
 160  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114. 
 161  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114. 
 162  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115.  Professor Laudan also curiously argues, without citing 
authority, “A voluntary admission of guilt by the defendant to the police (even after being 
Mirandized) can be retracted by the defendant, thereby becoming inadmissible at trial, unless 
there is independent evidence corroborating the confession.”  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115.  
Why Professor Laudan says this is a mystery.  Certainly a defendant may retract a confession, 
but that hardly makes the confession inadmissible.  Such confessions are routinely admitted 
at trial, both as substantive evidence of guilt and as impeachment of the defendant’s testimony 
should he or she take the stand and proclaim innocence. 
 163  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)). 
 164  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115. 
 165  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 116. 
 166  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 116. 
 167  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117 (citing FED. R. EVID. 608). 
 168  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117. 
 169  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117. 
 170  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117. 
 171  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 119–20. 
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So much is wrong here it’s hard to know where to start, and I only have 
space to address some of the problems.  Professor Laudan is certainly correct 
that exclusionary rules, although only rarely invoked successfully, favor the 
defense and have a truth-suppressing effect.  Professor Laudan ignores, 
however, that the system has adopted those rules fully aware that they have 
those effects, but has created them nonetheless because they serve values 
entirely independent of the truth-seeking functions of the trial, such as 
protecting the privacy rights of all citizens, guilty or innocent. One can 
debate the wisdom, and effect, of those rules, but it is not a part of the trade-
off between protecting the innocent from wrongful convictions and the 
potential future victims of guilty-but-acquitted individuals.  It is a different 
debate altogether.  A similar analysis applies to exclusion of statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda (although some such exclusions might 
actually enhance reliability because unwarned confessions—especially 
coerced ones—might be more likely to be untrue than others). 
Most of the other rules or procedures Professor Laudan cites either are 
neutral (not defense-favoring), or exist precisely because the rules-makers 
have concluded that they will enhance, not diminish, access to the truth—
and therefore they are designed to serve both conviction of the guilty and 
acquittal of the innocent.  Some that Professor Laudan cites even actually 
favor the prosecutor, not the defense.  Rules against character evidence and 
prior acts evidence, hearsay, unfairly prejudicial evidence (Rule 403), and 
privileges, for the most part apply equally to both parties and all witnesses.  
Professor Laudan’s claim that the fact that the prosecutor presents her case 
first advantages the defense is puzzling, at best.  And the hearsay rules, the 
rules against character and other acts evidence, and against unfairly 
prejudicial evidence, are designed to keep out evidence that impedes access 
to the truth—that is, precisely in order to enhance reliability of the 
proceedings for all parties, and thereby to reduce both false positives and 
false negatives. 
Some of the features that Professor Laudan criticizes as too defense 
friendly actually operate in the opposite way. Allowing the prosecution to go 
first is among those.  The principle of primacy and recency teaches that the 
most influential and memorable evidence is usually that which is heard first 
and last.172  By going first, the prosecutor gets to take advantage of that 
principle, and moreover gets to shape the narrative for the rest of the trial.173  
 
 172  See, e.g., James L. Farr, Response Requirements and Primacy-Recency Effects in a 
Simulated Selection Interview, 57 J. APP. PSYCH. 228 (1973); James L. Farr & C. Michael 
York, Amount of Information and Primacy-Recency Effects in Recruitment Decisions, 28 
PERSONNEL PSYCH. 233 (1975); Norman Miller & Donald T. Campbell, Recency and Primacy 
in Persuasion as a Function of the Timing of Speeches and Measurements, 59 J. ABNORMAL 
PSYCH. 1 (1959). 
 173  Much of Professor Laudan’s concern with the sequence at trial is that the defendant 
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Moreover, although Professor Laudan wholly overlooks it, the prosecutor 
also gets to go last—the prosecutor is permitted to present a rebuttal case 
whenever the defense presents anything unanticipated. In closing arguments, 
as in the evidentiary portions of the trial, the prosecutor also gets to present 
both first and last, while the defense gets to argue only once with no 
opportunity to respond to what the prosecutor says in rebuttal.  Most 
knowledgeable litigators would vastly prefer the opportunity to go both first 
and last in presenting evidence and arguing; this is no advantage to the 
defense, but a distinct advantage to the prosecution. 
In other ways, the rules Professor Laudan cites distinctly disadvantage 
the accused. Professor Laudan claims, for example, that, “in trials where the 
defendant chooses not to testify, the trial judge will exclude the admission of 
prior crimes evidence in about 90% of the cases involving serial felons.”174  
Most scholars, however, note that the rule against admission of prior crimes 
evidence—which only prohibits use of alleged prior misconduct to prove an 
individual’s bad character or propensity to commit like crimes—is so riddled 
with exceptions and loose judicial interpretation that it rarely poses much of 
an obstacle to admission.175  Indeed, Professor Laudan’s sometimes-co-
author Ronald Allen has acknowledged, specifically with regard to such 
character evidence, that, “[a]lthough the American rules of evidence are 
often characterised in other countries as having many exclusionary rules, the 
 
gets to listen to all the other witnesses’ testimonies before testifying, while all other witnesses 
are typically sequestered.  Professor Laudan overlooks, however, that the prosecution too gets 
to exempt one of its key witnesses from sequestration orders; the lead case investigator is 
often permitted to remain at the prosecutor’s side throughout the trial, exempted from 
sequestration, able to listen to the other testimony in the trial before testifying—and even able 
to listen to the defendant’s testimony (if he testifies)—before testifying in rebuttal. 
 174  LAUDAN, supra, note 1, at 17 (citing Professors Allen and Laudan on prior 
convictions). 
 175  See, e.g., Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias, 
Uncharged Act Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 
1, 3 (2016) (“court decisions resolving Rule 404(b) issues have been quite liberal in sustaining 
theories of admissibility advanced by prosecutors, despite the fact that such admission often 
violates the prohibition on the use of character evidence to prove conforming conduct.”); 
Bruce D. Landrum, Military Rule of Evidence 404(b): Toothless Giant of the Evidence World, 
150 MIL. L. REV. 271, 271 (1995) (“Rule 404(b) is probably the most frequently litigated rule 
of evidence. Yet, the evidence that it excludes actually falls within a very narrow range.”); 
Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character 
Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 184 (“Contrary to . . . [the] 
conventional view, courts routinely admit bad acts evidence precisely for its relevance to 
defendant’s propensity.”); David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of 
Intent in the Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 219 (2011) (“In the last fifteen to 
twenty years . . . many federal courts have reversed their views and now generally take a 
welcoming or inclusionary approach to admission of prior similar acts for the purpose of 
showing intent.”); Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 579 (1985) (observing that prosecutors “will 
almost always succeed” in attempts to admit uncharged acts against criminal defendants). 
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truth is the exact opposite: virtually all relevant evidence comes in”176  
Recently, both the Federal Rules of Evidence and many state evidence codes 
have taken this trend a step further and have explicitly abolished the rule 
against using evidence of prior sexual assaults or child molestations (whether 
the defendant was convicted or not) to prove guilt in a new sexual assault177 
or child molestation178 case.  In this regard, these particular types of criminal 
defendants are singled out for a disadvantage that applies to no other litigant 
in any type of case, plaintiff or defendant, government or accused, civil or 
criminal.  And of course, as noted, the Rules of Evidence permit evidence of 
prior convictions to be admitted to impeach a defendant if she exercises her 
constitutional right to testify in her own defense.179  It blinks at reality to 
suggest that most evidence of prior alleged bad acts (let alone prior 
convictions) is hidden from juries. 
Moreover, Professor Laudan wholly overlooks other trial and 
evidentiary rules that distinctly favor the prosecution.  The direct connection 
doctrine, or its variants, for example, directly impedes the defendant’s ability 
to introduce relevant evidence of innocence in the form of evidence that 
some other party committed the crime.180  As I have explained it previously, 
 
Third-party perpetrator evidence is not admissible in most 
jurisdictions merely if it is relevant. Rather, under the direct 
connection doctrine, the evidence must be both relevant in the 
traditional sense (i.e., it must have a “tendency” to make the 
defendant’s guilt “less probable”), and it must have a “direct 
connection” to the crime. The rule frequently excludes evidence 
of strong motive or opportunity because courts often require 
“direct evidence placing the third party at the scene.” Because this 
rule imposes a super-relevancy requirement on the defendant’s 
ability to tell her story of innocence, it is hard to reconcile the rule 
with a professed overriding concern for protecting the innocent.181 
 
 176  Allen, supra note 143, at 140. 
 177  See FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a 
sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual 
assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”). 
 178  See FED. R. EVID. 414(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child 
molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child 
molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”). 
 179  FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 180  Different jurisdictions use various terminology to describe the direct connection 
requirement, including “clearly link,” “point directly,” “point unerringly,” “inherent 
tendency,” or “legitimate tendency,” but all essentially have the same effect.  See Findley & 
Scott, supra note 71, at 343 n.337.   
 181  Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the 
Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 925–26 (2008) (footnotes omitted).  See also 
David S. Schwartz & Chelsea B. Metcalf, Disfavored Third-Party Guilt Evidence, 2016 WIS. 
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Similarly, several of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay explicitly 
or in practice uniquely restrict defense-proffered evidence.  The rules, for 
example, create a hearsay exception for statements against penal interest if 
the declarant was unavailable at the time of trial.182  But one type of 
statement-against-interest testimony is uniquely disfavored: evidence 
proffered by a criminal defendant to show that someone else might have 
committed the crime.  Rule 804 provides: “A statement tending to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.”183  The rule does not similarly burden such 
evidence when offered by the prosecution in a criminal case, or when offered 
by any party in a civil action.  Again, such skewing of admissibility standards 
is hard to reconcile with an overriding commitment to protecting the 
innocent, or with Professor Laudan’s claim that the hearsay rule somehow 
favors the defense. 
The hearsay rules are also applied in other ways that favor the 
prosecution. Eleanor Swift has shown that courts apply disparate standards 
of admissibility for “contextual” evidence offered to complete the narratives 
presented by the parties to exclude defendants’ statements about their then-
existing state of mind (another hearsay exception), even though such 
evidence should be admissible under Rule 803(3), and even though it may 
be critical context information needed to make a defendant’s narrative 
complete and plausible.184 
And it is by now well known that when it comes to admitting forensic 
science evidence, the courts perform their gate-keeping role under Rule 
702185 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,186 in uneven ways 
that disadvantage the defense and fail to ensure reliability of the evidence 
used to convict.  Empirical data on judicial decisions on such expert 
testimony reveal that non-validated, unscientific forensic “science” 
 
L. REV. 337, 337 (2016) (arguing that the direct connection doctrines’ disfavored treatment of 
third-party guilt evidence “stems from discredited and abandoned concepts of evidence law 
and is out of step with the Federal Rules of Evidence and modern evidence codes.  The direct 
connection doctrines wrongly transfer credibility questions from the jury to the judge and 
raise only minimal FRE 403-type dangers to justify their systematic exclusion.  Moreover, 
the direct connection doctrines unconstitutionally interfere with the defendant’s right to 
present a complete defense.  They lack any non-arbitrary justification.”). 
 182  See FED. R. EVID. 804(a), 804(b)(3). 
 183  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 184  Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime 
State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975 (2008). 
 185  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 186  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).   
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evidence187 proffered by the prosecution is routinely admitted, while defense 
expert evidence, even well researched and validated evidence (such as expert 
testimony on eyewitness identifications188), is routinely excluded.189 
C. The Pretrial Case-Building Stage 
Professor Laudan’s contention that the rules of the game favor criminal 
defendants—flawed as it is—focuses almost exclusively on the rules that 
govern trials.  Yet trials are the rare exception; almost all criminal law is 
adjudicated without a trial.  As noted, more than 95% of all convictions are 
obtained not after a trial, but by plea.190  We have essentially an 
administrative system of criminal justice, in which state administrators—
police and prosecutors working together—develop the evidence and 
determine the outcomes, which are usually formally processed in guilty or 
no contest plea proceedings.191  Hence, in most cases, the defendant’s fate is 
sealed long before trial (or the guilty plea hearing)—when the evidence is 
created, collected and packaged. 
To overlook that stage of the process, then, is to overlook the real 
machinery of the criminal justice system.  When one does examine that part 
of the process, the picture that emerges is entirely inconsistent with Professor 
Laudan’s thesis that the system is hopelessly tilted in favor of the accused.  
While Professor Laudan acknowledges that the state typically has superior 
resources and greater access to the evidence, he underestimates the 
significance of these advantages.  At these pretrial, case-development stages, 
the state has a virtual monopoly on the process.  Police typically have sole 
access to the crime scene and the crime scene evidence, which the defense 
can only later access through the notoriously limited and weak discovery 
provisions in criminal cases.  Pretrial detention adds to the defendant’s 
limited ability to conduct an independent investigation.  Police can threaten 
 
 187  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NRC 
REPORT]. 
 188  See Findley, supra note 181, at 922–24. 
 189  See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions 
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003); Findley, supra note 
181, at 939–43; Garrett, supra note 55, at 76, 81; Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s 
“Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1076 (2003); Jennifer L. Groscup 
et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal 
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 342 (2002), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.o
rg/b386/f5131178d3e5f916698f62e83837c2587043.pdf; Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) 
Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal 
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 143–49 (2000). 
 190  See MOTIVANS, supra note 94, at STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl. 4.2. 
 191  See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117 (1998). 
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and lie to suspects and witnesses to induce cooperation and statements, and 
prosecutors can compel testimony in grand juries, while the defendant can 
do neither.  Prosecutors can offer benefits (lenient treatment, immunity, even 
cash) in return for testimony—conduct that would be a crime for any other 
litigant192  And police and prosecutors have their own crime laboratories.193  
As Ion Meyn has observed, “[t]he irony is apparent.  A criminal defendant 
has more constitutional protections than any litigant during trial, but all other 
litigants have far greater access to information and have a greater ability to 
test evidence during the pretrial period, where over 90% of all disputes are 
actually resolved.”194 
VI. TOWARD HARM REDUCTION WITHOUT INCREASING WRONGS 
Professor Laudan contends: 
 
We have to remind ourselves of two features of the data collection 
system that guarantees that we miss many recidivist acts. I refer, 
of course, to the fact that, where violent crimes are concerned, a). 
only about 45% of crimes are reported to the police, b). the police 
arrest and charge only about 30% of the violent offenders.  That 
all means that c). there are some 1.2m violent crimes committed 
every year in which the police never identify the culprit. It is 
inconceivable that most of those unsolved crimes were not 
perpetrated by serial felons who escaped arrest or conviction. If 
that is so (and I cannot imagine otherwise), we have to recognize 
that the recidivist harms caused by serial felons are much greater 
 
 192  See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that 
the government alone has the legal right to “give[], offer[], or promise[] anything of value to 
any person, for or because of testimony,” even though such conduct by any other litigant 
would constitute the crime of bribery).  
 193  For a discussion of these and other advantages that the government enjoys in 
developing and investigating the evidence that determines case outcomes, see Findley, supra 
note 181, at 898–907. 
 194  Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 
46–47 (2014).  And that power—to develop the facts that become the reality of the case—is 
awesome.  Meyn puts it this way: “The executive wields impressive pre-complaint 
investigatory powers.  Free from judicial review, this inquiry will remain largely shielded 
from defendant’s eyes.  State agents are authorized to search, seize, arrest, and interrogate 
both willing and unwilling witnesses.  The investigative method of an officer summarizing 
his findings in a police report lacks any transparency.  This lack of transparency permits the 
opportunity to dissimulate information.  Any later attempt to correct the record will involve a 
police officer’s word against the account of the witness. State agents thus exercise “formal” 
(the power to compel) investigatory powers that produce a non-transparent factual record 
largely insulated from later review.  This opportunity is not afforded to any other litigant in 
the common law system.”  Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted); see also Ion Meyn, Discovery and 
Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) 
(arguing that structural deficits in the criminal justice system impede the defense from 
conducting adequate investigations). 
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still than I have described them.195 
 
These data are indeed significant—but primarily for a different reason 
than Professor Laudan posits.  What these data show is that most crimes go 
unpunished not because of failure to prove guilt under the reasonable doubt 
standard.  Most crimes go unpunished because they are never reported to 
police or police never apprehend a suspect.  “Beyond a reasonable doubt” 
has nothing to do with that.  If the concern is to prevent future harms from 
recidivist behavior, our efforts would be much better spent addressing the 
conditions that produce crime and the reasons police fail to solve such a high 
proportion of crimes.  More investigative resources would do far more for 
public safety than tinkering with the burden of proof and thereby running the 
risk of exacerbating what is already emerging as a serious problem of 
wrongful conviction of the innocent. 
Professor Laudan, however, does not seriously consider other ways of 
dealing with crime than to ratchet up conviction rates and sentence lengths, 
along with false convictions.  Professor Laudan thinks almost exclusively in 
terms of trade-offs between public safety and protection of the innocent, and 
he comes down on the side of public safety.  Professors Laudan and Allen, 
for example, write that “the remedies usually proposed for the ‘excessive’ 
levels of false conviction involve measures that further increase the already 
grave risk of criminal victimization.”196  That, however, does not reflect the 
real thrusts of the innocence movement, as we shall see. 
But first I must acknowledge that some scholars and advocates, to be 
sure, have urged dramatic reforms of the criminal justice system to provide 
greater protections against conviction of the innocent, some of which would 
reduce accurate convictions.  Recently, for example, in SAFETY FROM FALSE 
CONFESSIONS Boaz Sangero systematically analyzed known wrongful 
convictions and advocated a series of reforms.197  In addition to the standard 
reforms innocence organizations typically endorse to respond to the 
“canonical list”198 of factors that contribute to wrongful convictions (e.g., 
improving eyewitness identification procedures, electronically recording 
interrogations, improving the scientific foundations of the forensic 
“sciences,” etc.), Professor Sangero advocates broad structural reforms, such 
as prohibiting convictions based on a single piece of evidence,199 making the 
 
 195  Laudan, supra note 1252 (footnote omitted). 
 196  Allen & Laudan, supra note 2, at 80. 
 197  SANGERO, supra note 81. 
 198  See Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186 
(2008). 
 199  SANGERO, supra note 81, at 57–64. 
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“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard even more demanding,200 prohibiting 
conviction based on a confession absent strong corroboration and evidence 
that the interrogee knew unrevealed details about the crime,201 and the like.  
Some of those reforms would involve trade-offs (hence I will call them 
“trade-off reforms”)—reducing the rate of false positives through reforms 
that increase the rate of false negatives.  Critics have argued, therefore, that 
their viability and justifiability are dependent on showing both a high rate of 
false convictions and that the high rate of false convictions is 
disproportionately caused by the systemic features he proposes to alter.  And, 
those critics contend, such data are just not there to make those claims. 
Doron Menashe and Sivan Biber, for example, criticize Professor 
Sangero’s trade-off reforms, contending “it seems hard to substantiate a 
whole safety theory on such meager empirical data, no matter how good the 
extrapolation methods are [for estimating that data].”202 And, they add, the 
reform theories that Professor Sangero relies upon “cannot be tested for 
refutability because the relevant data is ‘hidden,’ and so it does not adhere to 
Karl Popper’s principle of falsifiability.”203  Accordingly, they contend, 
“[e]ven from a moral point of view it’s questionable if we should take safety 
measures to prevent hypothetical ‘accidents,’ while those measures will 
certainly and very tangibly harm other important moral values, like the right 
to personal security.”204 
If that is true for reforms designed to prevent false convictions, like 
Professor Sangero’s, then it is certainly true—indeed even more so, given 
the relative dearth of data on false acquittals—for reforms designed to 
prevent false acquittals, like those offered by Professor Laudan and his 
fellow anti-Blackstonians.  All of Professor Laudan’s reforms—most 
prominently the recommendation to lower the burden of proof in some 
cases—are explicitly trade-off reforms.  Indeed, they are intended to be such. 
Professor Laudan’s whole goal is to imprison more people, and to do so by 
reducing the number or proportion of people who are acquitted (defined 
broadly to include dismissals), including of necessity a percentage that are 
actually innocent.  While Professor Laudan works hard to extrapolate both a 
false conviction and a false conviction rate in order to justify this change, the 
reality is those rates are mere guesses—quite debatable guesses at that—and 
hence no basis for making fundamental alterations of our structures affecting 
 
 200  SANGERO, supra note 81, at 65–66. 
 201  SANGERO, supra note 81, at 95. 
 202  Doron Menashe & Sivan Biber, Safety from False Convictions by Boaz Sangero—
Book Review, J. JURIS. 147, 154 (2017). 
 203  Id. (citing KARL POPPER CONJUNCTURES AND REFUTATIONS—THE GROWN OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 33–58 (5th ed. 1989)). 
 204  Menashe & Biber, supra note 202, at 154. 
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fundamental rights, like the burden of proof, that were deliberately created 
to reflect the value preferences of our system.  The consequences would 
surely be unknown, likely to some extent at least unintended, and perhaps 
disastrous. 
To Professor Laudan, the interests in protecting the innocent and 
convicting the guilty, like the trade-off reforms that Professors Menashe and 
Biber criticize, are always in tension; pursue one, and you suffer losses to 
the other. In Professor Laudan’s binary world: 
 
If we say to ourselves (as many jurists and legal scholars do) that 
we must take new and additional measures to minimize the 
likelihood of a false positive, then we are apt to try to modify the 
legal system by a variety of additional rules that make it even 
harder than it now is for the prosecutor to establish the guilt of a 
defendant. (Indeed, that is a quick thumbnail summary of the 
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence about criminal law in the 
last half century.)205 
 
Professor Laudan reiterates: “We know full well that the greater the 
pains a state takes to protect its innocent citizens from false conviction, the 
more difficult it is for the state to control crime, since measures adopted to 
achieve the former end will typically make it more difficult to convict the 
guilty, which in turn . . . make controlling crime much more difficult.”206 
To the contrary, however, most of the reforms that innocence 
organizations advocate are not trade-off reforms, but “win-win reforms,” or 
at least what we might call “no-loss reforms”—they reduce the rate of false 
convictions by improving the diagnostic capacities of the system, not by 
putting a thumb on one side of the scales of justice.207  Indeed, despite their 
criticisms of Professor Sangero’s trade-off reforms, Professors Menashe and 
Biber acknowledge that 
 
 
 205  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 15. 
 206  LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 23. 
 207  It is worth noting that Paul Cassell, another of Zalman’s “anti-Blackstonians,” unlike 
Professor Laudan, recognizes the possibility of no-loss reforms.  See Paul G. Cassell, Can We 
Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid 
Harmful Trade-offs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 264 (Daniel S. 
Medwed ed. 2017).  Interestingly, though, most of Cassell’s no-loss reforms adhere to his 
crime-control orientation in that they include, among others, abolishing the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, overruling Miranda (and simultaneously requiring electronic 
recording of custodial interrogations), and requiring all defense attorneys to ask their clients 
if they committed the crime.  Id. at 274–80.  Some of these might have some effect on 
mitigating wrongful convictions, but others likely would not, for reasons that are beyond the 
scope of what I can explore here. 
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other “safety measures” offered by Sangero, like improving police 
lineup identification protocol or recording lineups on video—
which will give the court a direct, full documentation of the 
evidence—will provide fact-finders better information about the 
nature of the specific eyewitness testimony laid before them, 
while leaving them full discretion about the weight of that piece 
of evidence and the ability to convict upon it.  Under those 
restraints Sangero’s theory can truly be considered a win-win 
improvement to evidence law.208 
 
Professors Menashe and Biber also include reforming forensic sciences 
to improve their scientific validity as another type of win-win reform.209 
In his now-classic summary of the reforms, Sam Gross described the 
standard list of innocence-based reforms as follows: 
 
There is a canonical list of factors that lead to false convictions: 
eyewitness misidentification; false confession; misleading, false, 
or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly motivated 
police informants such as “jailhouse snitches;” perjury in general; 
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal defense. All these 
factors are common among cases of known exonerations.210 
 
For reasons I have previously articulated in detail, most fixes for almost 
all of these error points are no-loss reforms, not trade-off reforms; they 
almost universally strive to improve the reliability of the system without 
forcing dramatic trade-offs.211  I will not cover that ground again here, except 
to address one—eyewitness identification reform—because Professor 
Laudan identifies it, I believe misleadingly, as a trade-off reform.212 
The most widely discussed of the core innocence reforms is to improve 
the way police collect eyewitness identification evidence (and related 
reforms, such as admitting expert testimony so jurors are better equipped to 
rationally evaluate eyewitness evidence).  The range of reforms typically 
includes ensuring non-suggestive construction of lineups and photo arrays 
with appropriate fillers; instructing witnesses that the true perpetrator might 
or might not be present, so that witnesses do not feel compelled to pick 
someone even if the real perpetrator is not present; using a detective to run 
the procedure who does not know who the suspect is (or otherwise “blinding” 
 
 208  Menashe & Biber, supra note 202, at 156 (footnotes omitted). 
 209  Id. at 151–52. 
 210  Gross, supra note 198, at 186.  
 211  Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm for Criminal Justice: How the Innocence 
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133 (2008). 
 212  See LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 129–32. 
FINDLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2018  9:44 AM 
1314 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1265 
the detective) so that the detective cannot even unwittingly cue the witnesses 
(so-called “double-blind” administration); including only one witness per 
identification procedure; conducting only one identification procedure per 
witness; and promptly assessing the eyewitness’s level of confidence, before 
the witness is given any confirming or disconfirming feedback.213  The social 
science research literature on these reforms is extensive, and confirms that 
they are indeed no-loss, if not win-win reforms. 
In his book, however, Professor Laudan, hones in on just one of the 
reforms that has been widely discussed, and argues that it threatens to cause 
a loss of factually correct convictions.  That additional reform is the 
recommendation, adopted in some jurisdictions, that police present fillers 
and suspects in a photo array or lineup to the witness sequentially rather than 
simultaneously, as has been done traditionally.214  Professor Laudan’s point 
is that this is a classic trade-off reform because, while it does reduce mistaken 
identification, it also reduces accurate identifications.  There is, indeed, some 
evidence from laboratory studies suggesting that the sequential procedure 
does have this general suppressing effect, reducing both mistaken and 
accurate picks.215  But Professor Laudan’s treatment of this issue is both 
incomplete and misleading, for three reasons. 
First, as noted, this is only one of the many reforms innocence 
advocates have advanced for improving eyewitness evidence, and the others 
do not involve this type of trade-off, and it is the one that those reformers 
recommend least often.  Given that there is legitimate laboratory data 
suggesting a trade-off for the sequential procedure, innocence advocates 
usually make note of the sequential procedure, but do not necessarily 
advocate it; they instead advise policy makers that they need to consider the 
possible trade-offs for themselves and decide what policy they want to 
pursue.  The Innocence Project—the flagship innocence organization—for 
example, lists the following on its web site as the key reform elements: (1) 
“The ‘Double-blind’ Procedure/Use of a Blind Administrator;” (2) 
“Instructions That the Suspect May Not be Present;” (3) “Composing the 
Lineup [So That All Fillers Match the Description of the Perpetrator;]” (4) 
“[Prompt Recording of] Confidence Statements;” and (5) “The Lineup 
Procedure Should Be Documented.”216  The sequential procedure is not 
 
 213  For a fuller summary of the standard eyewitness identification reforms, see Keith A. 
Findley, Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis of 
Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies, 81 MO. L. REV. 377, 386–400 (2016). 
 214  See LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 129–32. 
 215  See, e.g., Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and 
Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
459, 468 (2001). 
 216  Eyewitness Identification Reform: Mistaken Identifications are the Leading Factor In 
Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/eyewi
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among them.  This, alone, belies Professor Laudan’s claim that innocence 
reformers “are apparently wedded to the idea that any measure that reduces 
the false conviction rate is to be preferred over its rival(s), no matter what 
the cost paid in lost true convictions may be.”217 
Second, Professor Laudan’s argument is misleading because of the way 
he presents the data from the laboratory studies.  It is true, as he reports, that 
in the laboratory the sequential procedure reduces both mistaken and 
accurate identifications.  But Professor Laudan wholly ignores that the 
reason some advocates push for the sequential, and some policy makers 
(including many police departments) choose it, nonetheless, is because its 
diagnosticity ratio—that is, the ratio of accurate picks to mistakes—is 
dramatically improved with the sequential procedure.  The meta-analytic 
data reveal that, in laboratory studies, accurate identifications are reduced 
from about 50% to about 35%.  But mistaken identifications of innocent 
suspects are reduced even more dramatically, from 27% to 9%.218  That 
translates into a dramatic increase in the diagnosticity ratio from 1.85 (0.50/
0.27) for the simultaneous procedure to 3.89 (0.35/0.09) for the sequential 
procedure.219  In other words, with the sequential procedure the overall rate 
of picking may be lower, but when witnesses do pick, they are much more 
likely to be correct. 
Third, and finally, Professor Laudan ignores field research, as opposed 
to laboratory research, that shows that in actual case work the sequential 
procedure reduces the rate that witnesses pick innocent fillers (known 
mistakes), but does not produce any drop-off in the rate of suspect picks.220  
The most prominent field study—the best real-world data we have—
suggests that the sequential procedure might be not a trade-off reform at all, 
but indeed a no-loss reform.  Nonetheless, despite Professor Laudan’s 
indictment that innocence reformers do not care about trade-off costs, the 
Innocence Project, out of an abundance of caution, has reserved judgment on 
the sequential procedure. 
In a short prior article Professor Laudan has also criticized other aspects 
of the eyewitness-identification-reform agenda, most notably the 
recommendation that witnesses should be given “unbiased” instructions 
(informing the witness that the real perpetrator might or might not be 
present), and the preference for lineup or photo array procedures over 
 
tness-identification-reform/. 
 217  LAUDAN, supra note 1. 
 218  Steblay, supra note 215, at 463; Wells, supra note 136, at 627. 
 219  See Wells, supra note 136, at 627. 
 220  Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An 
Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 Law & HUM. 
BEHAV. 1 (2015).  
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showups (one-on-one identification confrontations on the street between a 
witness and a single suspect).221  Those criticisms, however, are hard to 
reconcile with serious concern about the search for the truth.  To complain 
about “unbiased” witness instructions is akin to complaining about rules that 
prohibit police from telling the witness which lineup member to pick because 
it reduces the rate at which witnesses pick the suspect.  If it reduces 
conviction rates—and the research actually shows that unbiased instructions 
in fact improve reliability without any appreciable reduction in accurate 
picks222—then it does so only by preventing the police from cheating, and 
by ensuring that the evidence is actually real evidence. 
Contrary to Professor Laudan’s criticisms, the preference for lineups 
over show-ups also is well supported by the research as a no-loss or even 
win-win reform.223  Moreover, Professor Laudan entirely overlooks that one 
reason show-ups are so much more dangerous to the search for the truth is 
because in a target-present lineup,224 when a witness makes a mistake and 
picks a filler, usually no harm is done, because police know the witness has 
erred.  No one goes to prison wrongly for it.  But in a show-up, where there 
are no fillers, when a witness makes a mistaken identification, that mistake 
will always incriminate an innocent person whom police will then pursue 
and prosecute.  Professor Laudan pays no heed to these real-world concerns, 





 221  Larry Laudan, Eyewitness Identifications: One More Lesson on the Costs of Excluding 
Relevant Evidence, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 272 (2012). 
 222  Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions 
and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 486–87 (1981).   
 223  Steven E. Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform: 
Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 238, 244 (2012) (noting 
that while some eyewitness identification reforms might cause some drop-off in correct 
identifications, lineups are superior to showups both in terms of reduced misidentifications 
and increased accurate identifications); Dawn J. Dekle et al., Children as Witnesses: A 
Comparison of Lineup Versus Showup Identification Methods, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1996) (discussing the risk of false positive identifications when showup 
procedures are used with children); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential 
Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW 
& HUMAN BEHAV. 391, 402 (1997) (discussing the increased danger of false identifications 
with showups); A. Daniel Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups 
and Lineups, 20 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 459, 475 (1996) (discussing the inferiority of showup 
procedures to successive lineups).   
 224  That is, a lineup that includes the suspect, as is typically the case in real-world police 
lineups. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The point of all this is, in the end, regardless of the rate of false 
convictions or false acquittals, we can all agree that the system can do better.  
But because the data about comparative rates of false positives and false 
negatives and about how to assess the comparative harms from each simply 
are not there, and do not appear to be reliably ascertainable, looking first for 
dramatic trade-off reforms is the wrong place to start.  As I have previously 
written: 
 
[O]nce the rate of wrongful convictions rises above the trivial 
level—and the evidence convincingly tells us that is now so—then 
we need not identify a precise rate of error to recognize the need 
for action. The question then becomes not so much how many 
wrongful convictions there are, but whether we can do anything 
to reduce the rate of error. Any wrongful convictions are too many 
if they can be avoided without imposing too much strain on the 
system. In this sense, as one prosecutor at a conference on 
preventing wrongful convictions asserted, the question is not one 
of how many innocents are wrongly convicted, but simply 
whether we can do better. Are there best practices that can be 
implemented to reduce that number, whatever it is? 
 
In this sense, the issue can be analogized to public transportation 
disasters, such as airplane crashes. The rate of airline crashes is 
minuscule; in 2007, the airline industry experienced only one fatal 
accident in about every 4.5 million departures. Nonetheless, we 
continue to take airline crashes very seriously, and do all we can 
to reduce the accident rate as much as possible. 
 
The rate of wrongful conviction is clearly much higher than that 
of airline crashes. And, like airline safety, there is much we can 
do to improve the reliability of the criminal justice system. The 
imperative is there, then, to learn about and implement the best 
practices that can make the system function more reliably. . . . “225 
 
Professor Laudan reminds us that the same can be said about false 
negatives.  But, just as with false convictions, that is most immediately and 
appropriately understood as a call for reforms to improve the overall 
functioning of the system, not to tilt the scales and trade one set of harms for 
another.  And there is much we can do in that regard by studying what 
actually works for preventing recidivism; by increasing resources for police, 
 
 225  Findley, supra note 72, at 1172–73. 
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prosecutors, and defense counsel for the indigent (because in an adversary 
system, robust defense counsel is a critical component in the process of 
ensuring accurate and full discovery and evaluation of the facts); by 
improving relations between police and low-income or minority 
communities so that they are more likely to trust them and report crimes; and 
the list goes on.  But what we should not do is abandon fundamental 
principles like the reasonable doubt standard that so thoroughly reflect who 
we are as a society, and thereby inevitably create a sad and wholly 
unnecessary trade-off—sacrificing even more innocent people to make the 
rest of us feel marginally safer. 
 
